ABSTRACT Finnis’s theory of law distinguishes between law in the focal sense and law in the legal sense. Law in the focal sense is law that promotes the common good. Citizens may appeal to considerations of justice in deciding whether to obey a law. In short, they can use the focal sense in their deliberations. But judges must apply the law in the legal sense. This divided view of law leads to problems. The argument from inconsistent obligations says that the legal system is internally inconsistent. When a person rightly disobeys an unjust law, and a judge ‘rightly’ punishes them, the system seems to speak with two voices, and endorse unjust punishment. The second argument is the argument from authority. The source of a judge’s authority is the common good. When justice is not done, the source of the judge’s authority evaporates. How should this be resolved? If judges may appeal to considerations of justice, we run into Rule of Law problems. Thus, Finnis appears to be stuck in a dilemma: either permit judges to do justice, at the cost of the Rule of Law, or require them to apply the law in the legal sense, at the cost of justice.

中文翻译：

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芬尼斯的分裂法律观：审判理论的问题

摘要 芬尼斯的法律理论区分了焦点意义上的法律和法律意义上的法律。焦点意义上的法律是促进公共利益的法律。公民在决定是否遵守法律时可以诉诸正义的考虑。简而言之，他们可以在他们的审议中使用焦点感。但法官必须在法律意义上适用法律。这种对法律的分歧看法导致了问题。来自不一致义务的论点表明法律体系内部不一致。当一个人正确地违反不公正的法律，而法官“正确地”惩罚他们时，系统似乎会用两种声音说话，并支持不公正的惩罚。第二个论点是来自权威的论点。法官权威的来源是公共利益。当正义得不到伸张时，法官权威的来源就消失了。这应该如何解决？如果法官可以诉诸司法的考虑，我们就会遇到法治问题。因此，芬尼斯似乎陷入了两难境地：要么允许法官以法治为代价伸张正义，要么以正义为代价要求他们在法律意义上适用法律。