Nicholas McBride’s The Humanity of Private Law: Part I. Explanation is, in many ways, a ground-breaking work in private law theory. The book makes highly ambitious claims about the nature of private law, human flourishing and Western liberal societies – something rather unusual in contemporary legal theory, in which we have grown accustomed to a more piecemeal approach to legal phenomena – and substantiates those claims with arguments taken from English private law, history and philosophy. McBride does not shy away from discussing highly contested issues such as the true nature of morality, the history of English private law, or even fairly abstruse topics such as the metaphysics of Being and ‘the implications of an undifferentiated noumenal reality for a Kantian right to independence’. As one would expect with a wide-ranging book such as this, some readers might feel a bit disappointed with the length and depth in which some of the issues are addressed, and some readers might find that some of the arguments are not particularly well crafted. Its shortcomings notwithstanding, McBride’s book is an original and welcome addition to the literature on private law theory that deserves to be widely discussed by philosophers of private law, even by those not particularly interested in English private law. The aim of this review is to comment on two main issues: (i) the critiques that McBride addresses to competing accounts of private law (I claim that they miss the mark) and (ii) the account of human flourishing that McBride sees as underlying English private law, which he calls the ‘RP’ (‘RP’ stands both for ‘reflective picture’ and ‘received picture’ of human flourishing). The relationship between the RP and English private law idea is at the core of McBride’s project, and it is by far the most original suggestion of the book. Somewhat surprisingly, McBride also thinks that the RP is the wrong view of human flourishing, which means that current English private law is actually an impediment to the real human flourishing of its subjects. Although it is fairly difficult to criticise McBride’s project without having a better sense of his own idea of how private law should look like after the correct view of human flourishing is in place – something he promises to deliver in ‘Part II’ of his project – I shall nevertheless raise some worries about the nature and content of the RP as explained by McBride.

中文翻译：

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私法的人性。第一部分：说明

Nicholas McBride 的《私法的人性：第一部分》在很多方面解释是私法理论的开创性著作。这本书对私法、人类繁荣和西方自由社会的性质提出了非常雄心勃勃的主张——这在当代法律理论中相当不寻常，在当代法律理论中，我们已经习惯于对法律现象采取更加零碎的方法——并用所采取的论点来证实这些主张来自英国私法、历史和哲学。麦克布莱德并不回避讨论诸如道德的真实本质、英国私法的历史，甚至是相当深奥的话题，例如存在的形而上学和“未分化的本体现实对康德权利的影响”等极具争议的问题。独立'。正如人们对这样一本范围广泛的书所期望的那样，有些读者可能对某些问题的长度和深度感到有些失望，有些读者可能会发现有些论点不是特别精心设计。尽管有缺点，麦克布莱德的书是私法理论文献的原创和受欢迎的补充，值得私法哲学家广泛讨论，即使是那些对英国私法不特别感兴趣的人。这篇评论的目的是评论两个主要问题：（i）麦克布莱德对私法竞争性描述的批评（我声称他们没有达到目标）和（ii）麦克布莱德认为作为基础的人类繁荣的描述英国私法，他称之为“RP”（“RP”代表人类繁荣的“反思图”和“收到的图”）。RP 与英国私法思想的关系是麦克布莱德项目的核心，也是本书迄今为止最原始的建议。有点出人意料的是，麦克布莱德还认为 RP 是人类繁荣的错误观点，这意味着当前的英国私法实际上是对其主体真正的人类繁荣的障碍。尽管在正确认识人类繁荣之后，如果没有更好地了解他自己的私法应该是什么样子的想法，就很难批评麦克布赖德的项目——这是他承诺在他的项目的“第二部分”中实现的——尽管如此，我还是会对 McBride 解释的 RP 的性质和内容提出一些担忧。这是本书迄今为止最原始的建议。有点出人意料的是，麦克布莱德还认为 RP 是人类繁荣的错误观点，这意味着当前的英国私法实际上是对其主体真正的人类繁荣的障碍。尽管在正确看待人类繁荣的正确观点到位之后，如果没有更好地了解他自己的私法应该是什么样子的想法，就很难批评麦克布赖德的项目——这是他在项目的“第二部分”中承诺提供的——尽管如此，我还是会对 McBride 解释的 RP 的性质和内容提出一些担忧。这是本书迄今为止最原始的建议。有点出人意料的是，麦克布莱德还认为 RP 是人类繁荣的错误观点，这意味着当前的英国私法实际上是对其主体真正的人类繁荣的障碍。尽管在正确认识人类繁荣之后，如果没有更好地了解他自己的私法应该是什么样子的想法，就很难批评麦克布赖德的项目——这是他承诺在他的项目的“第二部分”中实现的——尽管如此，我还是会对 McBride 解释的 RP 的性质和内容提出一些担忧。这意味着当前的英国私法实际上是阻碍其主体真正实现人类繁荣的障碍。尽管在正确认识人类繁荣之后，如果没有更好地了解他自己的私法应该是什么样子的想法，就很难批评麦克布赖德的项目——这是他承诺在他的项目的“第二部分”中实现的——尽管如此，我还是会对 McBride 解释的 RP 的性质和内容提出一些担忧。这意味着当前的英国私法实际上是阻碍其主体真正实现人类繁荣的障碍。尽管在正确认识人类繁荣之后，如果没有更好地了解他自己的私法应该是什么样子的想法，就很难批评麦克布赖德的项目——这是他承诺在他的项目的“第二部分”中实现的——尽管如此，我还是会对 McBride 解释的 RP 的性质和内容提出一些担忧。