ABSTRACT The city of Bombay (later Mumbai) has witnessed two deadly seaborne terrorist attacks in 1993 and 2008, respectively. Recurring with a gap of 15 years, the latter had a similar nature and goal as that of the former. Apart from the seaborne character, there was state sponsorship from Pakistan, nexus with organized criminal groups and communal objectives. The only difference was that the 2008 attacks were carried out with greater sophistry as a result of the right lessons learnt from 1993, and a greater involvement of the Pakistani ‘deep state’. The central question approached in this article is how does a nation cope with such a triad threat perception? On examination of the intelligence prerogative for terrorist operations, the inevitability of counterintelligence responses is established. It is argued that the intelligence solution to the terrorist problem lies in ‘counterintelligence’ (CI), especially offensive CI, rather than traditional intelligence gathering.

中文翻译：

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印度的海上恐怖主义和反情报：挑战和担忧

摘要 孟买市（后来的孟买）分别在 1993 年和 2008 年目睹了两次致命的海上恐怖袭击。后者时隔15年，与前者有着相似的性质和目标。除了海运特点，还有来自巴基斯坦的国家赞助，与有组织的犯罪集团和共同目标的联系。唯一的区别是，由于从 1993 年吸取了正确的教训，以及巴基斯坦“深层国家”的更大参与，2008 年的袭击更加诡辩。本文探讨的核心问题是一个国家如何应对这种三合会威胁认知？在审查恐怖主义行动的情报特权时，反情报反应的必然性就确立了。