ABSTRACT

This article examines Bergson’s critique of intensive magnitude in Time and Free Will. I demonstrate how his rejection of a different kind of quantity that is ordinal and does not allow measurement, and the underlying strict dualism of quantity and quality, is inconsistent with both the letter and the spirit of his later philosophy. I dismantle two main strategies for explaining these inconsistencies. Furthermore, I argue that Bergson’s simplistic conception of quantity in terms of homogeneous multiplicity, which is operative in his rejection of an alternative conception of quantity, lacks justification in the face of the transformations that the concept of quantity underwent in the history of mathematics and physics.

摘要

本文考察了伯格森对《时间与自由意志》的强烈批评。我证明了他对序数的，不允许测量的另一种数量的拒绝以及对数量和质量的严格的二元性与他后来的哲学思想和精神是不一致的。我将分解两种主要策略来解释这些不一致之处。此外，我认为，柏格森关于齐次多重性的简单化的数量概念有效地拒绝了另类的数量概念，但面对数学和物理学史上经历的数量概念的转变，却缺乏正当性。