ABSTRACT

This article demonstrates why Husserl struggled to understand the conditions of possibility of false memory, and how only the genetic dimension of his phenomenology enabled him to conceive of a specifically mnemic form of falsehood. For a false memory to deceive us, we must trust that it is true, but in order to have a phenomenology of its falsehood, the memory must appear as false. Husserl’s theory of false memory responds to both of these demands by showing how distorting syntheses (repression, filling-in, re-touching) conceal themselves, without making it impossible to discover their distorting effects. Key to meeting these two demands is Husserl’s account of how the unconscious functions as the “untrue” basis of memory, and how all recollections (both true and false) require affective, associative syntheses between present conscious experience and past unconscious experience, syntheses that are subject to many vicissitudes.

摘要

本文说明了胡塞尔为何努力理解错误记忆的可能性条件，以及仅现象学的遗传学维度才使他能够构想出虚假的虚假形式。为了使虚假的记忆欺骗我们，我们必须相信它是真实的，但是为了对虚假的现象进行现象学，记忆必须表现为虚假的。胡塞尔的错误记忆理论通过显示扭曲的合成（压制，填充，修饰）如何掩盖自己，而又无法发现它们的扭曲效果，从而对这两种要求做出了回应。满足这两个要求的关键在于，胡塞尔对无意识如何作为记忆的“不真实”基础以及所有回忆（对与错）都需要情感，