ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to defend the thesis, found across the works of Edmund Husserl, that the most fundamental level of subjectivity – the so-called absolute consciousness – is given in time as an immediate unity. In order to do so, I first consider Martin Hägglund’s critique of the Husserlian absolute consciousness. My subsequent answer to Hägglund has two parts: firstly, I argue that Hägglund’s own account of subjectivity is contradictory; secondly, I offer a model of absolute consciousness impervious to Hägglund’s critique. Drawing on Husserl’s “Bernau Manuscripts,” I demonstrate that time is, in fact, compatible with the notions of immediacy and unity, and that a correct account of the Husserlian absolute consciousness recognizes the latter to be given as a temporally differentiated immediate unity.

摘要

本文的目的是捍卫在埃德蒙·胡塞尔 (Edmund Husserl) 的作品中发现的论点，即主观性的最基本层次——所谓的绝对意识——在时间中作为一个直接的统一体被给予。为此，我首先考虑马丁·赫格隆德对胡塞尔绝对意识的批判。我随后对 Hägglund 的回答有两个部分：第一，我认为 Hägglund 自己对主观性的解释是矛盾的；其次，我提供了一个不受 Hägglund 批评影响的绝对意识模型。借助胡塞尔的“贝尔瑙手稿”，我证明了时间实际上与直接性和统一性的概念是相容的，并且胡塞尔绝对意识的正确描述承认后者被认为是在时间上有区别的直接统一性。