ABSTRACT Trust, especially in the initial stages of trust building, is often assumed to be the result of deterrence-based trust. While theorising acknowledges its importance, research on deterrence-based trust has been scarce. To facilitate the investigation of the concept, we designed new versions of the trust game in which we studied both trust (Experiment 1) and trustworthiness (Experiment 2). To better model deterrence-based trust we extended a trust game with an additional phase where trustors could accept or reject the trustee’s distribution. We varied consequences of the rejection option as a delta bargaining game, thereby manipulating the potential for deterrence. The results showed that trustors were highly responsive to the possibility to reject the trustee’s distribution. Trustees, however, seemed largely unaffected and were generally highly trustworthy. Together these findings show how trust games can meaningfully be extended to assess the effect of deterrence-based trust in bargaining.

中文翻译：

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基于威慑力的讨价还价信任：引入新的实验范式

摘要信任，尤其是在信任建立的初期，通常被认为是基于威慑的信任的结果。尽管理论上承认其重要性，但基于威慑的信任的研究却很少。为了便于对该概念的研究，我们设计了信任游戏的新版本，在其中我们研究了信任（实验1）和可信度（实验2）。为了更好地建立基于威慑的信任模型，我们扩展了信任游戏的附加阶段，在此阶段中，信任者可以接受或拒绝受托者的分配。我们将拒绝选择的后果作为三角谈判游戏进行了变化，从而操纵了威慑的潜力。结果表明，受托人对拒绝受托人分配的可能性有高度的反应。受托人，但是，似乎基本上没有受到影响，并且总体上值得信赖。这些发现共同显示了信任博弈如何可以有意义地扩展以评估基于威慑力的信任在谈判中的效果。