ABSTRACT In the Norwegian real estate market, used dwellings are normally sold through an auction process similar to the standard English (open ascending-bid) auction. Using survey results (N = 1,803), we define jump bids and investigate the motivations behind the use of such strategies. We find that most bidders tend to consider intimidation and signalling as the main motivations for applying a jump-bidding strategy, and intimidation strategies applied by competing bidders appear to be an important reason for bidders withdrawing early from an auction. We also use a sample of 1,142 auction journals and find that, on average, auctions containing jump bids achieve 2.8–9.3 percent higher price premiums compared to strictly straightforward-bidding auctions. The premium is higher when the intimidation strategy fails and competing bidders counter with jump bids. Additionally, this paper provides evidence that jump bids are usually placed at the earliest stage of the auction and have a stronger intimidation effect the earlier they are placed, despite having an overall positive effect on the premium. The results are robust to different valuation approaches and omitted variable bias controls. Our findings have important implications for sellers and buyers in auction settings, and for regulators of auction processes.

中文翻译：

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战略性竞标对住宅英语拍卖的影响

摘要在挪威的房地产市场中，二手房通常是通过类似于标准英语（公开竞价）拍卖的拍卖过程出售的。利用调查结果（N = 1,803），我们定义了跳高竞价并调查了使用此类策略的动机。我们发现大多数竞标者倾向于将恐吓和信号作为采用跳标策略的主要动机，竞争竞标者采用的恐吓策略似乎是竞标者提早退出拍卖的重要原因。我们还使用了1142种拍卖期刊的样本，发现与严格的直接竞标拍卖相比，包含跳跃竞价的拍卖平均可以实现高2.8-9.3％的价格溢价。当恐吓策略失败并且竞标者拒绝竞标时，溢价会更高。此外，本文提供的证据表明，尽管对溢价有总体正面影响，但跳水出价通常是在拍卖的最早阶段进行的，并且在提早出价时具有更强的威胁作用。结果对于不同的评估方法是可靠的，并且省略了可变偏差控制。我们的发现对拍卖环境中的买卖双方以及拍卖程序的监管者都具有重要意义。结果对于不同的评估方法是可靠的，并且省略了可变偏差控制。我们的发现对拍卖环境中的买卖双方以及拍卖程序的监管者都具有重要意义。结果对于不同的评估方法是可靠的，并且省略了可变偏差控制。我们的发现对拍卖环境中的买卖双方以及拍卖程序的监管者都具有重要意义。