In 2009, The Journal of Musicology published two issues devoted to the study of music during the Cold War; the issues were bookended by essays written by Peter Schmelz and Richard Taruskin. Both authors argued that there was real value in interrogating music’s institutional and political contexts in the second half of the twentieth century, and in acknowledging the ways that political ideologies had attached cultural capital to certain aesthetic and stylistic languages. Additionally, both Schmelz and Taruskin proposed new directions for Cold War scholarship. Schmelz, drawing on historians Odd Arne Westad and Ann Douglas, emphasized that the Cold War should not be theorized as only a geopolitical battle between Soviet and American powers, but rather as a set of ideas and beliefs that both animated and periodized the years following WWII. To do so would open up space for recognizing “uncomfortable similarities” in the political and cultural conditions on both sides of the Iron Curtain. On this point, Taruskin expounded further, pointing out that scholars of Eastern Europe had never had the option of ignoring the relationship between politics and culture; he urged scholars of American and Western European music to think critically about the meaningful political work that music was doing in those spheres. In the decade since these 2009 publications, many scholars have responded to Taruskin’s challenge, nuancing our understanding of the global networks that supported composition and performance during this period. For example, Lisa Jakelski’s Making New Music in Cold War Poland (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016) takes the Warsaw Autumn International Festival of Contemporary Music as its subject, but Jakelski moves well beyond an institutional study, raising important questions about transnational cultural exchange. Working from a global perspective, Danielle FoslerLussier’s Music in America’s Cold War Diplomacy (Oakland: University of California Press, 2015) traces the multidirectional flows of power that complicated the U.S. State Department’s goals for generating unidirectional influence through cultural diplomacy. Philip Gentry’s What Will I Be?: American Music and Cold War Identity presents readers with another new path for Cold War study. Like Jakelski and Fosler-Lussier, he challenges readers to think about creators, performers, and audiences in the postwar period. However, instead of looking to global networks and transnational exchanges, he turns inward to the United States. Gentry argues – perhaps controversially – that, within the United States, the experience of the Cold War was primarily a domestic one. The international pressures of global conflict were less urgent for postwar Americans than were the myriad internal changes and perceived threats that affected their lives. Even Senator McCarthy, for whom the Cold War provided “the tools he needed for political success ... was distinctly unconcerned with the realities of the Cold War in an international sense, as evidenced by his attacks on the State Department and the U.S. Army.”

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我将成为什么？：美国音乐和冷战身份，菲利普 M. 绅士

2009 年，The Journal of Musicology 发表了两期专门讨论冷战时期音乐的问题；这些问题由彼得·施梅尔茨和理查德·塔鲁斯金撰写的文章收尾。两位作者都认为，在 20 世纪下半叶询问音乐的制度和政治背景，以及承认政治意识形态将文化资本附加到某些审美和风格语言的方式上，具有真正的价值。此外，施梅尔茨和塔鲁斯金都提出了冷战奖学金的新方向。Schmelz 借鉴历史学家 Odd Arne Westad 和 Ann Douglas 的观点，强调冷战不应仅被理论化为苏联和美国列强之间的地缘政治斗争，而应将其视为一系列在二战后活跃和分期的思想和信念. 这样做将为承认铁幕两边的政治和文化条件中的“令人不安的相似之处”开辟空间。对此，塔鲁斯金进一步阐述，指出东欧学者从未有过忽视政治与文化关系的选择；他敦促美国和西欧音乐学者批判性地思考音乐在这些领域所做的有意义的政治工作。在这些 2009 年的出版物发表后的十年中，许多学者对塔鲁斯金的挑战做出了回应，使我们对在此期间支持构图和表演的全球网络有了细微的了解。例如，Lisa Jakelski 的《在冷战波兰制作新音乐》（奥克兰：加州大学出版社，2016）以华沙秋季国际当代音乐节为主题，但雅克尔斯基远远超出了机构研究，提出了有关跨国文化交流的重要问题。Danielle FoslerLussier 的《美国冷战外交中的音乐》（奥克兰：加州大学出版社，2015 年）从全球视角出发，追溯了使美国国务院通过文化外交产生单向影响的目标复杂化的多向权力流动。菲利普·金特里的《我将成为什么？：美国音乐与冷战身份》为读者提供了另一条冷战研究的新途径。与 Jakelski 和 Fosler-Lussier 一样，他挑战读者去思考战后时期的创作者、表演者和观众。然而，与其着眼于全球网络和跨国交流，他转向美国。绅士认为——也许是有争议的——在美国，冷战的经历主要是国内的。对战后美国人来说，全球冲突的国际压力不如影响他们生活的无数内部变化和感知威胁那么紧迫。即使是参议员麦卡锡，冷战为他提供了“政治成功所需的工具……显然不关心国际意义上的冷战现实，他对国务院和美国军队的攻击证明了这一点。 ” 对战后美国人来说，全球冲突的国际压力不如影响他们生活的无数内部变化和感知威胁那么紧迫。即使是参议员麦卡锡，冷战为他提供了“政治成功所需的工具……显然不关心国际意义上的冷战现实，他对国务院和美国军队的攻击证明了这一点。 ” 对战后美国人来说，全球冲突的国际压力不如影响他们生活的无数内部变化和感知威胁那么紧迫。即使是参议员麦卡锡，冷战为他提供了“政治成功所需的工具……显然不关心国际意义上的冷战现实，他对国务院和美国军队的攻击证明了这一点。 ”