Abstract

This article utilizes the game theory to assess the feasibility and weaknesses of different methods to promote international judicial cooperation. It starts by justifying the game theory as a proper model to understand the pattern of interaction between states. It then applies typical games to analyse states’ decision-making process. It suggests that states should not update their domestic laws to unilaterally offer judicial cooperation to other countries even if reciprocity is adopted to urge other states to cooperate. The only effective means is through an international judicial cooperation treaty, which encounters relatively small compliance and enforcement problems. The first-mover disadvantage at the ratification stage is not a fundamental barrier and may disappear over time. The battle-of-the-sexes game at the negotiation stage can be mitigated through the facilitation of a reputable institute, increasing cooperation interests and needs and reducing cooperation standards.

中文翻译：

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博弈论中的国际司法合作

摘要

本文利用博弈论评估了促进国际司法合作的不同方法的可行性和弱点。首先从证明博弈论是理解国家之间相互作用模式的适当模型开始。然后应用典型的游戏来分析各州的决策过程。它表明，即使采用互惠来敦促其他国家合作，国家也不应更新其国内法律以单方面向其他国家提供司法合作。唯一有效的手段是通过一项国际司法合作条约，该条约遇到的遵守和执行问题相对较小。批准阶段的先发劣势不是根本障碍，随着时间的流逝可能会消失。