In 2008, as the financial crisis unfolded in the United States, the banking industry elevated its lobbying and campaign spending activities. By the end of 2008, and during 2009, the biggest political spenders, on average, received the largest bailout packages. Is that relationship causal? In this paper, I examine the effect of political connections on the allocation of funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to the US financial services industry during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. I find that TARP recipients that lobbied the government, donated to political campaigns, or whose top executives had direct connections to politics received better bailout deals. I estimate regression discontinuity design and instrumental variable models to uncover how election outcomes for politicians in close races affected the distribution of bailout funds for connected firms. The results do not imply that some banks were deliberately favored over others, just that favored banks benefited because of their proximity to the right people in power. If being politically connected matters in general, in times of crisis it matters even more.

2008 年，随着美国金融危机的爆发，银行业增加了游说和竞选支出活动。到 2008 年底和 2009 年期间，最大的政治支出者平均获得了最大的救助计划。这种关系是因果关系吗？在本文中，我研究了 2008-2009 年金融危机期间，政治关系对问题资产救助计划 (TARP) 向美国金融服务业的资金分配的影响。我发现游说政府、向政治运动捐款或其高管与政治有直接联系的 TARP 接受者获得了更好的救助协议。我估计了回归不连续性设计和工具变量模型，以揭示政治家在势均力敌的选举结果如何影响关联公司的救助资金分配。结果并不意味着某些银行被故意偏袒于其他银行，只是因为受青睐的银行因为靠近合适的掌权者而受益。如果说政治联系很重要，那么在危机时期就更重要了。