In this paper I offer a genetic account of how Wittgenstein developed his ideas on aesthetics in his 1933 lectures. He argued that the word ‘beautiful’ is neither the name of a particular perceptible quality, nor the name of whatever produces a certain psychological effect, and unlike ‘good’, it does not stand for a family-resemblance concept either. Rather, the word ‘beautiful’ has different meanings in different contexts as we apply it according to different criteria. However, in more advanced regions of aesthetics the word ‘beautiful’ ceases to play an important role. Instead, we judge things to be more or less correct according to genre-specific standards or criteria, which in an aesthetic discussion are presupposed, rather than argued for. Finally, Wittgenstein came to realise that providing support for an aesthetic appraisal according to some given criteria is not the only and perhaps not even the main focus of aesthetic discussion. More interesting to him became the idea of a puzzle or perplexity in aesthetics, which he discussed in greater detail in his 1938 lectures.

中文翻译：

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1933年讲座中维特根斯坦美学观的出现

在本文中，我提供了维特根斯坦在1933年的演讲中如何发展他的美学思想的遗传学说明。他认为，“美丽”一词既不是特定可感知质量的名称，也不是产生某种心理影响的任何事物的名称，并且与“良好”不同，它也不代表家庭相似的概念。相反，“美丽”一词在不同环境下具有不同的含义，因为我们根据不同的标准来应用它。但是，在更高级的美学领域，“美丽”一词不再发挥重要作用。取而代之的是，我们根据特定于体裁的标准或标准来判断事物的正确性，这在美学讨论中是预设的，而不是主张的。最后，维特根斯坦开始意识到，根据某些既定标准为美学评估提供支持并不是美学讨论的唯一重点，甚至不是重点。对他来说，更有趣的是美学上的困惑或困惑的想法，他在1938年的演讲中对此进行了更详细的讨论。