This paper investigates the way in which we adduce reasons in support of our aesthetic judgements. We examine the seemingly question-begging nature of that process, such that any aesthetic quality we adduce as a reason can be found compelling qua reason for a particular judgement if and only if that judgement is already assented to. We then analyse this phenomenon in the parallel contexts of gustatory taste and friendship, where the differences are understood to lie primarily with differences in the normative force of reasons held in support of gustatory judgements, aesthetic judgements, and personal friendships. While some question-begging obtains in all cases, in the latter we can begin to see that friendship can be justified with reference to its contribution to the good of ourselves. This is explored further in connection with the way in which examining our reasons for being friends with people is actually productive and generative of that friendship. Our conclusion is that while the giving of reasons for aesthetic judgements is still subject to a certain question-begging, those judgements acquire a powerful normative force in cultural contexts where it can be seen that assenting to them constitutes the realization of our good as individuals.

中文翻译：

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论审美理性的道德心理与规范力

本文研究了我们采用理由支持美学判断的方式。我们检查了该过程看似乞讨的性质，这样，当且仅当该判断已被接受时，我们发现作为理由的任何美学品质都可以被认为是令人信服的理由。然后，我们在味觉味觉和友谊的平行语境中分析这种现象，其中的差异主要被理解为支持味觉判断，审美判断和个人友谊的原因的规范力上的差异。尽管在所有情况下都会出现一些乞讨的问题，但在后一种情况下，我们可以开始看到，友谊可以根据其对自身利益的贡献而被证明是合理的。结合探讨我们成为人与人的理由实际上是这种友谊的成果和产生的方式，对此进行了进一步的探索。我们的结论是，尽管给出审美判断的理由仍然受到某种质疑的要求，但这些判断在文化背景中获得了强大的规范力量，在这种文化背景下，可以看到对他们的支持构成了我们个人的美好实现。