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The Contingency of Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles
Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy ( IF 0.5 ) Pub Date : 2017-12-01 , DOI: 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0004.031
Julia Jorati

Leibniz’s famous Principle of the identity of indiscernibles (Pii) states that no two things are exactly alike. The Pii is commonly thought to be metaphysically necessary for Leibniz: the coexistence of two indiscernibles is metaphysically impossible. This paper argues, against the standard interpretation, that Leibniz’s Pii is metaphysically contingent. in other words, while the coexistence of indiscernibles would not imply a contradiction, the Pii is true in the actual world because the Principle of Sufficient reason rules out violations of the Pii. God could have created indiscernibles but he did not because he is wise and does nothing without a sufficient reason. Because it is plausible that all Leibnizian possible worlds are unified by a wise plan, this means that the Pii is true in all possible worlds. God could create indiscernibles, but the resulting creation would not be a world. To argue for this conclusion, the paper carefully examines Leibniz’s mature account of metaphysical contingency. it shows that for Leibniz, only states of affairs that imply logical contradictions are metaphysically impossible. next, it argues that the coexistence of indiscernibles would not imply a logical contradiction; it would merely imply what Leibniz calls a “moral absurdity,” that is, a violation of the Principle of Sufficient reason. This means that the Pii is true contingently and— since God can do whatever is metaphysically possible— that God can create two things that are exactly alike.

中文翻译:

莱布尼兹不可识别身份原则的偶然性

莱布尼兹(Leibniz)著名的“不可识别的身份原则(Pii)”指出,没有两件事是完全一样的。通常认为,对于莱布尼兹来说,Pii是形而上学必需的:两个难以区分的事物的共存在形上学上是不可能的。本文与标准解释相反,认为莱布尼兹的Pii具有形而上的偶然性。换句话说,虽然不能并存并不意味着矛盾,但是Pii在现实世界中是正确的,因为充分理由原则排除了对Pii的侵犯。上帝本可以创造出难以区分的事物,但他之所以没有这样做,是因为他很聪明,没有充分的理由就什么也不做。因为通过明智的计划将所有莱布尼兹可能世界统一是合理的,这意味着Pii在所有可能世界中都是正确的。上帝会创造出不可分辨的东西,但是最终的创造将不是一个世界。为了证明这一结论,本文仔细检查了莱布尼兹对形而上的偶然性的成熟描述。它表明,对于莱布尼兹来说,只有形而上学上不可能暗示逻辑矛盾的事态。其次,它认为不可区分的并存并不意味着逻辑上的矛盾。这仅意味着莱布尼兹所说的“道德荒谬”,即违反了“充分理由原则”。这意味着Pii可能是真实的,并且-因为神可以做在形而上学上可能做的一切-神可以创造出两个完全相同的事物。只有暗示逻辑矛盾的事态在形而上学上是不可能的。其次,它认为不可区分的并存并不意味着逻辑上的矛盾。这仅意味着莱布尼兹所说的“道德荒谬”,即违反了“充分理由原则”。这意味着Pii可能是真实的,并且-因为神可以做在形而上学上可能做的一切-神可以创造出两个完全相同的事物。只有暗示逻辑矛盾的事态在形而上学上是不可能的。其次,它认为不可区分的并存并不意味着逻辑上的矛盾。这仅意味着莱布尼兹所说的“道德荒谬”,即违反了“充分理由原则”。这意味着Pii可能是真实的,并且-因为神可以做在形而上学上可能做的一切-神可以创造出两个完全相同的事物。
更新日期:2017-12-01
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