In the context of two recent yet distinct philosophical debates— over choice under conditions of moral uncertainty and over transformative choices— several philosophers have implicitly adopted a thesis about how to evaluate alternatives of uncertain value. The thesis says that the value a rational agent ought to attach to an alternative under the hypothesis that the value of this alternative is x, ought to be x. I argue that while in some contexts this thesis trivially holds, in the context of the two debates in which the thesis has been adopted, it does not. I also discuss several implications of this failure.

中文翻译：

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价值是否在假设价值之下？

在最近两次截然不同的哲学争论的背景下-在道德不确定性条件下过分选择和在变革性选择上过分-一些哲学家隐含地采用了一篇关于如何评估不确定性价值选择的论文。论文说，在这种选择的价值是x的假设下，理性主体应该附加到选择的价值。我认为，尽管在某些情况下本论文是微不足道的，但在通过本论文的两次辩论的背景下，却没有。我还将讨论这种失败的几种含义。