当前位置: X-MOL 学术Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Verbal Disputes in the Theory of Consciousness
Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy ( IF 0.5 ) Pub Date : 2018-02-16 , DOI: 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.012
Joseph Gottlieb

The primary aim of a theory of consciousness is to articulate existence conditions for conscious states, i.e. the conditions under which a mental state is conscious rather than unconscious. There are two main broad approaches: The HigherOrder approach and the FirstOrder approach. HigherOrder theories claim that a mental state is conscious only if it is the object of a suitable state of higherorder awareness. FirstOrder theories reject this necessary condition. However, both sides make the following claim: for any mental state M of a subject S, M is conscious iff there is something it is like for S to be in M. This is the Nagelian Conception of consciousness. Taking the Nagelian Conception as a starting point, I contend that the best rationalizing explanation for the ways in which HigherOrder and FirstOrder theorists contribute to their dispute is to see those contributions as consistent responses to two distinct questions.

中文翻译:

意识理论中的语言争议

意识理论的主要目的是阐明意识状态的存在条件,即精神状态是有意识的而不是无意识的条件。有两种主要的广泛方法:HigherOrder方法和FirstOrder方法。高等秩序理论主张,只有当心理状态是适当的高阶意识状态的对象时,精神状态才是有意识的。FirstOrder理论拒绝了这种必要条件。但是,双方都有以下主张:对于对象S的任何精神状态M,如果S在M中存在某种感觉,则M是有意识的。这就是纳吉利意识概念。以纳粹主义的观念为起点,
更新日期:2018-02-16
down
wechat
bug