The dominant framework for addressing procreative ethics has revolved around the notion of harm, largely due to Derek Parfit’s famous nonidentity problem. Focusing exclusively on the question of harm treats what procreators owe their offspring as akin to what they would owe strangers (if they owe them anything at all). Procreators, however, usually expect (and are expected) to parent the persons they create, so we cannot understand what procreators owe their offspring without also appealing to their role as prospective parents. I argue that prospective parents can wrong their future children just by failing to act well in their role as parents, whether or not their offspring are ultimately harmed or benefitted by their creation. Their obligations as prospective parents bear on the motivations behind their reproductive choices, including the choice to select for some genetic trait in their offspring. Even when procreators’ motivations aren’t malicious, or purely selfish, they can still fail to recognize and act for the end of the parental role. Procreators can wrong their offspring by selecting for some genetic trait, then, when doing so would violate their obligations as prospective parents, or when their motivation for doing so is antithetical to the end of the parental role.

中文翻译：

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使未来的孩子感到困惑

解决生殖伦理问题的主要框架围绕伤害的概念展开，这主要归功于德里克·帕菲特（Derek Parfit）著名的身份认同问题。专门关注伤害问题，将生育者欠其后代的钱等同于欠欠陌生人的东西（如果欠欠他们任何东西）。但是，生产者通常期望（并被期望）将他们所创造的人作为父母，因此我们无法理解生产者应归功于其后代的情况，而又不呼吁他们作为准父母。我认为，准父母可能会因为不能很好地扮演父母的角色而对未来的孩子造成伤害，无论他们的后代是否最终受到伤害或受益。他们作为准父母的义务取决于他们生育选择的动机，包括选择后代的某些遗传特征。即使生育者的动机不是恶意的，也不是纯粹自私的，他们仍然可能无法意识到父母的角色并采取行动。繁育者可以通过选择某种遗传特征来对后代进行错误对待，然后这样做会违反其作为准父母的义务，或者这样做的动机与父母角色的结束背道而驰。