According to ontological nihilism there are, fundamentally, no individuals. Both natural languages and standard predicate logic, however, appear to be committed to a picture of the world as containing individual objects. This leads to what I call the expressibility challenge for ontological nihilism: what language can the ontological nihilist use to express her account of how matters fundamentally stand? One promising suggestion is for the nihilist to use a form of predicate functorese, a language developed by Quine. This proposal faces a difficult objection, according to which any theory in predicate functorese will be a notational variant of the corresponding theory stated in standard predicate logic. Jason Turner (2011) has provided the most detailed and convincing version of this objection. In the present paper, I argue that Turner’s case for the notational variance thesis relies on a faulty metasemantic principle and, consequently, that an objection long thought devastating is in fact misguided.

中文翻译：

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一种本体论虚无主义的语言

根据本体论的虚无主义，基本上没有个人。但是，自然语言和标准谓词逻辑似乎都致力于包含单个对象的世界图景。这导致了我所说的本体论虚无主义的可表达性挑战：本体论虚无主义者可以用什么语言来表达她对事物的根本立场的论述？对于空想主义者，一个有希望的建议是使用一种形式的谓词函子，一种由Quine开发的语言。该提议面临一个困难的反对意见，根据该提议，谓词函子中的任何理论都将成为标准谓词逻辑中所陈述的相应理论的符号化变体。杰森·特纳（Jason Turner，2011）提供了该异议的最详尽和令人信服的版本。在本文中，