In his characteristically excellent paper, “A New Defense of Hedonism about WellBeing,”1 Ben Bramble provides a series of highly original arguments defending a new kind of hedonism. Specifically, Bramble argues for a hedonism that (1) adopts a feltquality (as opposed to an attitudebased) theory of pleasure and pain2 (§ 4), (2) makes use of an important distinction between “the degree to which a pleasure is pleasurable” and the “ease with which one can introspect it” (101), and, crucially, (3) holds that purely repetitious pleasures add no value to one’s life (§ 4). We’ll refer to this third component of his view as the NonRepetition Requirement and any version of hedonism that adopts this requirement as a version of NonRepeatable Hedonism. The NonRepetition Requirement is what makes Bramble’s hedonism unique, and it is the target of this paper.3 We pose a dilemma for NonRepeatable Hedonism. We argue that it is either committed both to a deeply implausible asymmetry between how pleasures and pains affect a person’s wellbeing and to deeply implausible claims about how to maximize wellbeing, or is committed to the claim that a life of eternal pleasure for a person can be just as good for them as a life of eternal suffering. The only way out of this dilemma is for Bramble to reject the NonRepetition Require-

中文翻译：

---

不可重复的享乐主义是错误的

本·布兰堡（Ben Bramble）在他极有特色的优秀论文“关于幸福感的享乐主义的新辩护”中，提出了一系列捍卫一种新型享乐主义的高度原创论据。具体而言，布兰堡（Bramble）主张享乐主义：（1）采用愉悦和痛苦的感觉质量（与基于态度的相反）[2]（第4节），（2）利用“享乐的程度”这一重要区别。 ”和“可以反思的轻松度”（1​​01），并且至关重要的是，（3）认为，纯粹的重复性快乐不会给人的生活带来任何价值（第4节）。我们将把他的观点的第三部分称为“非重复性要求”和将这种要求采用的“享乐主义”的任何版本作为“不可重复享乐主义”的版本。不重复要求是使Bramble享乐主义独特的原因，也是本文的目标。3我们为不可重复享乐主义带来了两难选择。我们认为，这要么是因为享乐和痛苦如何影响一个人的幸福之间的一种令人难以置信的不对称，要么是关于如何最大限度地提高幸福感的一种令人难以置信的主张，要么是一种主张可以使一个人享有永恒的快乐的生活。就像对他们永远的痛苦一样有益。解决这一难题的唯一方法是让布兰堡拒绝“非重复要求”，