A longstanding debate in the philosophy of action opposes causalists to anti-causalists. Causalists claim the authority of Davidson, who offered powerful arguments to the effect that intentional explanations must be causal explanations. Anti-causalists claim the authority of Wittgenstein, who offered equally powerful arguments to the effect that reasons cannot be causes. My aim in this paper is to achieve a rapprochement between Davidsonian causalists and Wittgensteinian anti-causalists by showing how both sides can agree that reasons are not causes, but that intentional explanations are causal explanations. To this end, I first defuse Davidson's Challenge, an argument purporting to show that intentional explanations are best made sense of as being explanatory because reasons are causes. I argue that Wittgenstein furnishes anti-causalists with the means to resist this conclusion. I then argue that this leaves the Master Argument for the claim that intentional explanations are causal explanations, but that by distinguishing between a narrow and a wide conception of causal explanation, we can resolve the stalemate between Wittgensteinian anti-causalists impressed by the thought that reasons cannot be causes and Davidsonian causalists impressed by the thought that intentional explanations must be causal explanations.

中文翻译：

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戴维森因果主义和维特根斯坦反因果主义：和解

长期以来，关于行动哲学的辩论反对反共主义者反对反共主义者。讽刺主义者声称戴维森的权威，戴维森提供了有力的论据，证明故意解释必须是因果解释。反讽主义者声称维特根斯坦（Wittgenstein）的权威，维特根斯坦（Wittgenstein）同样提出有力的论据，证明理由不能成为原因。我在本文中的目的是通过展示双方如何能够同意原因不是原因，而故意解释是因果关系的解释，来实现戴维森主义的反共主义者与维特根斯坦反反主义者之间的和解。为此，我首先化解戴维森的挑战，该论据旨在表明故意解释最好是解释性的，因为原因是原因。我认为维特根斯坦为反犹太主义者提供了抵制这一结论的手段。然后我辩称，这使大师争论中的主张是有意解释是因果解释，但是通过区分因果解释的狭义和广义概念，我们可以解决维特根斯坦反犹太主义者之间的僵局，其理由是：故意解释必须是因果关系的解释给戴维森主义的讽刺主义者留下了深刻的印象。