Is attention a cognitive process? I reconstruct and critically assess an argument first proposed by Christopher Mole that it cannot be so. Mole’s argument is influential because it creates theoretical space for a unifying analysis of attention at the subject level (though it does not entail it). Despite their differing theoretical commitments, prominent philosophers working on attention such as Wayne Wu and Philipp Koralus explicitly endorse it, while Sebastian Watzl endorses a related version. I show that Mole’s argument is invalid, amend it to secure its validity, but argue that it still fails. I consider the extent to which the failure of Mole’s argument spreads to the versions offered by Wu, Koralus and Watlz. Mole’s argument fails because it equivocates between the set of conditions that suffice for constituting attention and the subset of those conditions that are salient, but insufficient, for constituting it. Reflection on this distinction has consequences for the individuation not just of attentional processes but all cognitive processes.

中文翻译：

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莫尔关于认知过程的论点不能满足注意的要求吗？

注意是认知过程吗？我重构并批判性地评估了克里斯托弗·摩尔最初提出的论点，但事实并非如此。le鼠的论点之所以具有影响力，是因为它为在主题层次上对注意力的统一分析创造了理论空间（尽管并不一定要如此）。尽管他们在理论上有不同的承诺，但关注注意力的著名哲学家，例如韦恩·吴（Wayne Wu）和菲利普·科拉鲁斯（Philipp Koralus）都明确认可了该观点，而塞巴斯蒂安·沃茨（Sebastian Watzl）则认可了一个相关版本。我表明Mole的论点是无效的，请对其进行修改以确保其有效性，但认为它仍然失败。我认为，摩尔论的失败在多大程度上扩展到了吴，科拉鲁斯和沃茨所提供的观点。Mole的论证之所以失败，是因为它模糊了足以构成注意力的一组条件与那些构成注意力的显着但不足的条件的子集。对这种区别的反思不仅对注意力过程而且对所有认知过程的个体化都有影响。