This paper addresses the question of what the attitude of hope consists in. We argue that shortcomings in recent theories of hope have methodological roots in that they proceed with little regard for the rich body of literature on the emotions. Taking insights from work in the philosophy of emotions, we argue that hope involves a kind of normative perception. We then develop a strategy for determining the content of this perception, arguing that hope is a perception of practical reasons. Our proposal stands in contrast with familiar views on which hope is fundamentally about the good. We conclude by considering the increasingly popular idea that some hopes are nonintentional and thus, by implication, nonperceptual. We reply by arguing that our perceptual theory plausibly generalizes to these instances of hope.

中文翻译：

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希望的感知理论

本文讨论了希望态度包含什么的问题。我们认为，最近的希望理论中的缺点具有方法论根源，因为它们缺乏对情感的丰富文献的关注。从情感哲学的工作中获得见识，我们认为希望涉及一种规范性的感知。然后，我们提出一种策略来确定这种看法的内容，并认为希望是对实际原因的看法。我们的提议与人们对希望的根本在于对善的熟悉观点形成对照。我们通过考虑日益流行的想法得出结论，即有些希望是无意的，因此，暗含的是无知的。我们通过争辩说我们的知觉理论合理地概括了这些希望的例子。