Reporting one’s experience of the film Alien, one might say that one saw Warrant Officer Ellen Ripley fighting the monster, but one might also say that one imagined Ripley fighting the monster. This paper aims to figure out the experience that the verbs “to see” and “to imagine” aim to characterize in such reports. For this purpose, I first introduce four requirements for an account of film experience. Secondly, I examine the main theses on the role of imagination and perception in film experience, arguing that none of them satisfies all the requirements. Thirdly, I propose a new thesis according to which the spectator of a fiction film imagines being a subject of a different kind, namely, a disembodied subject of experience who can perceive events that occur in a world in which that subject has no place. I argue that this thesis satisfies all the requirements. Both perception and imagination seem to play a crucial role in our engagement with fiction films but whether they really do so, and which role they possibly play, is controversial. On the one hand, a fiction film, as film, is a depiction that invites us to perceive the events portrayed. On the other hand, as fiction, it invites us to imagine the story told. Thus, after watching the film Alien (1979), one might say that one saw Ripley fighting the monster but one might also say that one imagined Ripley fighting the monster. Are these two reports compatible? If they are, how can we combine them so to make sense of them? If, instead, they are not, which of them should we give up? In order to answer these questions, we need, first of all, to specify what we mean by ‘perception’ and ‘imagination’ and how we distinguish them. Among the traditional criteria for distinguishing perception from imagination, Shen-yi Liao and Tamar Gendler (2019: §2.3) mention intensity, involuntariness, and causal relationship with the relevant object. In his “Sartrean Account” 2 of perception and imagination, Uriah Kriegel (2015) proposes another criterion: these two kinds of mental states can have the same content but differ as regards their attitude. For instance, I can see an apple falling from a tree as well as imagine an apple falling from a tree. Although these mental states have the same content, they differ as regards the way in which they relate it to me as the subject of experience, namely, their attitude. Specifically, according to the attitudinal approach that I use to characterize film experience, the attitude of perception represents its content (for instance, the apple falling) as occurring here and now, in front of me, in a spatiotemporal structure that includes myself as the subject who is perceiving. The attitude of imagination, instead, represents its content as occurring in an alleged alternative spatiotemporal structure that does not include myself as the subject who is imagining.1 Given this distinction, how can we characterize film experience? When I watch Alien in a movie theater, there is a sense in which I experience Ripley fighting the monster here and now, in 1 The notion of spatiotemporal structure I use to distinguish between perception and imagination draws on Peter Strawson’s notion of a “spatiotemporal framework” that enables our experiences and allows us to share them through discourse: “We can make it clear to each other what or which particular things our discourse is about because we can fit together each other’s reports and stories into a single picture of the world; and the framework of that picture is a unitary spatio-temporal framework, of one temporal and three spatial dimensions” (1959: 38). In perception the spatiotemporal structure includes myself in the sense that I experience events as occurring in front of me simultaneously with my experience. In memory the spatiotemporal structure also includes myself in the sense that I experience events as occurring at a time that precedes my experience, and such relation of temporal precedence warrants that the remembering subject and the events remembered belong to the same spatiotemporal structure. Imagination, instead, represents events as occurring in an alternative spatiotemporal structure that is not that in which the imagining subject has his or her place. At most, this subject might represent an alternative version of him or her in that structure, as for instance when I imagine myself walking on the moon. Yet, in this imaginative scenario, I am not walking on the moon and imagining doing so. I am just walking. Conversely, if I perceive myself walking on the moon, I am walking on the moon and perceiving doing so. Thanks to a referee for leading me to clarify the notion of imagination on which my paper relies. 3 front of me, as a publicly accessible event which other subjects who now are here in the movie theater also can experience. This publicity distinguishes film experience from a paradigmatic case of imagination such as mental imagery, which is essentially private. Thus, I might feel entitled to report that I saw Ripley fighting the monster even though I do not feel entitled to report that I saw the pink elephant that I was visualizing on my own. Nevertheless, while watching Alien I also acknowledge that Ripley is not fighting the monster here and now in the same sense in which, say, the spectator in a nearby seat is munching popcorn here and now. First, I can interact with this spectator but not with Ripley and the monster. Secondly, I am aware that Ripley and the monster, unlike the popcorn muncher, do not exist. Thus, I might feel entitled to report that, while I surely perceived the popcorn muncher, I rather imagined Ripley and monster, that is, I experienced Ripley fighting the monster in a spatiotemporal structure that did not include myself. To sum up, film experience seems to lie between perception and imagination. Experiencing Ripley fighting the monster is more perceptual than a paradigmatic imaginative experience such as visualizing a pink elephant “with the eye of the mind”, and yet more imaginative than a paradigmatic perceptual experience such as perceiving a popcorn muncher in a nearby seat. However, lying between perception and imagination is just a metaphor, and one should unpack it if one wants to figure out the role that imagination and perception play in film experience. Philosophers have proposed settling this issue in three different ways. A first approach (see Matravers 2014) states that film experience essentially is a matter of perception while imagination plays no essential role even when we watch fiction films. A second approach (see Currie 1995) states that, even though film experience as such is perceptual, when we watch fiction films perception boils down to the input of an essentially imaginative experience. A third approach (see Wilson 2011) states that both imagination and perception play an essential role in our experience of fiction films. 4 The latter approach relies on the fact that one can include oneself in one’s imaginings. I can imagine not only an apple falling from a tree but also myself falling from a tree. Although the imagined scenario cannot actually include myself as the subject who is imagining, it can include an alternative version of me who is not imagining but just falling from a tree. Imagination essentially differs from perception in this respect. If I imagine falling, in my imagined scenario I am not falling while imagining doing so. If, instead, I perceive myself falling, I am falling while perceiving doing so. Such a capacity of including the subject of experience in the imagined scenario provides us with a way of combining imagination and perception in our engagement with fiction films. Perception can be embedded into the imagination. For instance, I can report my experience of Alien by saying that I imagined seeing Ripley fighting the monster. This approach to film experience seems capable of giving due consideration to both perception and imagination, but it confronts important problems, which my paper shall point out and try to solve. Specifically, I shall proceed in three steps. First, in Section 1, I highlight four requirements, which an account of film experience must satisfy. Secondly, in Sections 2–4, I examine the three main philosophical theses on imagination and perception in film experience that have been proposed so far, and I argue that they do not satisfy all the requirements. Thirdly, in Sections 5–8, I propose a fourth thesis and argue that it provides a better fit to the requirements than its rivals, and that it can also accommodate other relevant features of film experience. 1. Four Requirements As a starting point of this paper, I assume that any account of the role of imagination in our engagement with fiction films must satisfy the four requirements I am going to highlight. The first three come from the role of perception in film experience, while the fourth one comes from the very notion of fiction film. Relying on these requirements will make my conclusion a conditional: if the four requirements hold, then my account is better than its rivals. Still, there seems to be intuitive 5 support for these requirements so that one might be inclined to endorse them, and this would turn my conclusion into a full-fledged assertion. The four requirements are the following. i) Seeing-in: Film experience involves a perceptual experience of the things depicted. I call this requirement Seeing-in, but I am not committing myself to Richard Wollheim’s (1980) account of seeing-in or to any alternative conception of pictorial experience. What I call ‘Seeing-in’, here, is just the fact that we have a perceptual experience of the things we see in a film. This experience is perceptual inasmuch as it provides us with a perspective on mind-independent and publicly accessible things, which are arranged in a spatial structure involving a range and possibly obstructions (cf. Alsmith 2017; Martin 1992; Strawson 1974). Such perspectiv

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电影体验中的想象力与知觉

讲述一个人在电影《外星人》中的经历，也许有人会说，看准检察官埃伦·里普利（Ellen Ripley）正在与怪物战斗，但也有人会说，有人想象里普利（Ripley）与怪物战斗。本文旨在弄清“见”和“想”动词旨在表征此类报告的经验。为此，我首先介绍四个关于电影体验的要求。其次，我研究了关于想象力和知觉在电影体验中的作用的主要论文，认为它们都不能满足所有要求。第三，我提出了一个新论点，根据该论点，一部小说电影的旁观者可以想象是另一种主题，即无经验的主题，可以感知在这个主题没有位置的世界中发生的事件。我认为这篇论文可以满足所有要求。认知和想象力似乎都在我们与小说电影的互动中起着至关重要的作用，但它们是否真的如此以及它们可能扮演什么角色却存在争议。一方面，作为电影的虚构电影是一种描绘，它使我们能够感知所描绘的事件。另一方面，作为小说，它使我们能够想象故事的讲述。因此，在看了电影《异形》（1979）之后，也许有人会说看到里普利在与怪物战斗，但也有人会说人们想象里普利在与怪物战斗。这两个报告兼容吗？如果是的话，我们如何才能将它们结合起来以使它们有意义？如果不是，那么我们应该放弃其中的哪些？为了回答这些问题，我们首先需要 详细说明“感知”和“想象”的含义以及我们如何区分它们。在将感知力与想象力区分开来的传统标准中，廖沉怡和塔玛·金德勒（Tamar Gendler，2019：§2.3）提到了强度，非自愿性以及与相关物体的因果关系。乌里亚·克里格（Uriah Kriegel（2015）在其关于感知和想象力的“萨特雷亚账户” 2中提出了另一个标准：这两种心理状态可以具有相同的内容，但在态度上有所不同。例如，我可以看到苹果从树上掉下来，也可以想象苹果从树上掉下来。尽管这些心理状态具有相同的内容，但它们在将其与我作为经验主体联系起来的方式（即态度）方面有所不同。特别，根据我用来描述电影体验的态度方法，知觉的态度代表了它的内容（例如，苹果掉落）在我面前时空时空出现，时空结构中包括我自己作为主体，正在感知。相反，想象力的态度将其内容表示为一种所谓的时空结构，它并不包含我自己作为想象的对象。1鉴于这种区别，我们如何表征电影的体验？当我在电影院看外星人时，我会感觉到里普利在此时此刻与怪物战斗，在1中，我用来区分感知和想象力的时空结构概念借鉴了彼得·斯特劳森（Peter Strawson）的“时空框架”概念，该概念使我们的经验得以实现，并允许我们通过话语分享它们：“我们可以彼此清楚地了解什么或我们的论述涉及哪些特定的事物，因为我们可以将彼此的报告和故事整合在一起，形成一张单一的世界图片；而该图片的框架是一个时空和三个空间维度的单一时空框架”（1959：38）。在感知上，时空结构包括我自己，因为我会体验到与我的经历同时发生的事件。在记忆中，时空结构还包括我自己，即我经历的事件是在经历之前发生的，并且时间优先顺序的这种关系保证了记忆的主题和记忆的事件属于同一时空结构。相反，想象将事件表示为发生在替代时空结构中，而不是想象主体在其中的位置。最多，这个主题可能代表他或她在该结构中的另一个版本，例如，当我想象自己在月球上行走时。但是，在这种富有想象力的场景中，我不是在月球上行走，而是在想象中这样做。我只是在走。相反，如果我感觉自己在月球上行走，那我就是在月球上行走，并且感觉到这样做。感谢一位裁判带领我阐明论文所依赖的想象力概念。3在我的面前，这是一个可供公众访问的活动，现在在电影院中的其他主体也可以体验到。这种宣传将电影体验与想象力的范例案例（例如心理意象）区分开来，后者本质上是私人的。因此，即使我无权举报我看到自己独自看到的那头粉红色大象，我也可能有权利举报我看到Ripley与怪物战斗。不过，在观看《外星人》时，我也承认里普利并没有按照现在和现在在附近座位旁的观众正在用这种方式咀嚼爆米花的意义上与怪物战斗。首先，我可以与此观众互动，但不能与Ripley和怪物互动。其次，我知道里普利和怪兽不像爆米花一样，不存在。因此，我可能有资格举报，虽然我确实感觉到爆米花干cher，但我却想像里普利和怪物，也就是说，我经历了里普利在不包括我自己的时空结构中与怪物战斗。总而言之，电影经验似乎介于感知和想象之间。体验与里普利战斗的怪物比诸如“用心灵的眼睛”想象一只粉红色的大象这样的范式想象力体验更具感知力，但比诸如感知附近座位上的爆米花扑食者这样的范式感知体验更具想象力。但是，介于感知和想象之间只是一个隐喻，如果要弄清楚想象力和感知力在电影体验中所扮演的角色，就应该解开它。哲学家提出了以三种不同方式解决这一问题的建议。第一种方法（请参阅Matravers 2014）指出，电影体验本质上是一种感知问题，而即使我们观看小说电影，想象力也不会发挥重要作用。第二种方法（参见Currie 1995）指出，尽管电影经验本身是感知性的，但当我们观看小说电影时，感知却归结为本质上是想象性体验的输入。第三种方法（参见Wilson 2011）指出，想象力和知觉在我们的小说电影体验中都起着至关重要的作用。4后一种方法依赖于这样一个事实，即人们可以将自己包含在自己的想象中。我可以想象不仅苹果从树上掉下来，而且我自己从树上掉下来。尽管所设想的场景实际上不能将自己作为想像的对象，但它可以包含我的另一种形式，即我没有想象力，只是从树上掉下来。在这方面，想象力本质上不同于感知。如果我想着跌倒，在我想像的场景中，我并不是在想着跌倒。相反，如果我感觉自己在跌倒，那么我在感觉跌倒的同时也在跌倒。这种在想象的场景中包含经验主题的能力为我们提供了一种结合想象力和感知力来与小说电影互动的方式。知觉可以嵌入想象中。例如，我可以说自己想像看到里普利（Ripley）与怪物战斗，以此来报告我的外星人经历。这种电影体验方法似乎能够适当地考虑感知和想象力，但是它面临着重要的问题，我的论文将指出这些问题并尝试解决。具体来说，我将分三步进行。首先，在第1节中，我重点介绍了电影体验必须满足的四个要求。其次，在第2-4节中，我研究了到目前为止提出的关于电影经验中的想象力和感知力的三个主要哲学论点，我认为它们不能满足所有要求。第三，在第5-8节中，我提出了第四篇论文，并认为它比竞争对手更符合要求，并且它还可以适应电影体验的其他相关特征。1.四个要求作为本文的起点，我认为任何有关想象力在我们接触小说电影中的作用的说明都必须满足我要强调的四个要求。前三个来自感知在电影体验中的作用，而第四个来自于虚构电影的概念。依靠这些要求将使我的结论成为条件：如果满足这四个要求，那么我的帐户就会比竞争对手更好。尽管如此，似乎还是对这些要求有直观的5支持，因此人们可能倾向于认可它们，这将使我的结论成为完整的主张。以下是四个要求。i）参观：电影经验涉及对所描绘事物的感性体验。我称这个要求为 但是我并不是要致力于理查德·沃尔海姆（Richard Wollheim，1980）关于看书或任何其他绘画经验概念的描述。在这里，我所谓的“看中”就是我们对电影中所见事物的感知体验。这种体验是可感知的，因为它为我们提供了关于独立于思想和可公开访问的事物的观点，这些事物以空间结构排列，涉及范围和可能的障碍物（参见Alsmith 2017； Martin 1992； Strawson 1974）。这样的观点 它们被安排在一个包含一定范围和障碍物的空间结构中（参见Alsmith 2017； Martin 1992； Strawson 1974）。这样的观点 它们被安排在一个包含一定范围和障碍物的空间结构中（参见Alsmith 2017； Martin 1992； Strawson 1974）。这样的观点