I argue that Nietzsche’s criticism of the Kantian theory of disinterested pleasure in beauty reflects his own commitment to claims that closely resemble certain Kantian aesthetic principles, specifically as reinterpreted by Schiller. I show that Schiller takes the experience of beauty to be disinterested both (1) insofar as it involves impassioned ‘play’ rather than desiredriven ‘work’, and (2) insofar as it involves rationalsensuous (‘aesthetic’) play rather than mere physical play. In figures like Nietzsche, Schiller’s generic notion of play— which is itself influenced by Kant’s claim that aesthetic pleasure is orthogonal to desiresatisfaction— becomes decoupled from his (further) Kantian view that aesthetic play essentially involves a harmony of sensuous receptivity and rational spontaneity. The result, I suggest, is a selfstanding opposition between desires and passions. This motivates a recognizably Romantic vision of aesthetic disinterestedness, as freedom from desire realized in a state of creative determination by passion.

中文翻译：

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激情和无趣：从康德的免费游戏到权力的创造性决定，通过席勒和尼采

我认为，尼采对康德式的“无私享乐”理论的批评反映出他自己对与某些康德式美学原理极为相似的主张的承诺，特别是席勒（Schiller）的重新解释。我证明席勒（Schiller）认为美的体验是无私的（1）涉及热情的“游戏”而不是欲望驱动的“工作”，以及（2）涉及理性的（“审美”）游戏而不是单纯的身体游戏玩。在像尼采这样的人物中，席勒的一般游戏概念（其本身受康德的主张，即审美乐趣与欲望的满足是相互影响的），与他（进一步）的康德论认为审美游戏本质上是感性接受与理性自发性的和谐脱节。我建议结果是，是欲望和激情之间的独立对立。这激发了人们对浪漫主义的审美无私感的认识，因为在以激情进行创造性决定的状态下实现了摆脱欲望的自由。