Illusionists about phenomenal consciousness claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist but merely seems to exist. At the same time, it is quite intuitive for there to be some kind of link between phenomenality and value. For example, some situations seem good or bad in virtue of the conscious experiences they feature. Illusionist views of phenomenal consciousness then face what I call the normative challenge. They have to say where they stand regarding the idea that there is a link between phenomenality and value. If they accept that there is such a link, they might be committed to revisionary normative consequences (and some of them may prove to be uncomfortable). If they deny that there is such link, they might avoid revisionary normative consequences (without being guaranteed against them) but then they have to give reasons to deny that such link obtains, which is not a trivial task. The existence of the normative challenge does not show that illusionism is false, but it shows that illusionism might have important consequences in the normative domain, which have to be clarified.

中文翻译：

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幻觉者意识观的规范挑战

关于现象意识的魔术师声称，现象意识不存在，而仅仅是存在。同时，现象性与价值之间存在某种联系是很直观的。例如，根据某些情况的有意识经历，某些情况似乎是好是坏。幻觉主义者对现象意识的看法然后面对我所谓的规范性挑战。他们必须说出现象和价值之间存在联系这一观点。如果他们接受这种联系，那么他们可能会承担修订性的规范性后果（其中有些可能会感到不舒服）。如果他们否认存在这种联系，他们可能会避免修订性的规范性后果（无法保证不会受到不利影响），但随后他们必须给出理由否认获得这种联系，这并非易事。规范性挑战的存在并不表明幻觉主义是错误的，而是表明幻觉主义可能在规范性领域产生重要的后果，必须加以澄清。