It is widely agreed that hypocrisy can undermine one’s moral standing to blame. According to the Nonhypocrisy Condition on standing, R has the standing to blame some other agent S for a violation of some norm N only if R is not hypocritical with respect to blame for violations of N. Yet this condition is seldom argued for. Macalester Bell points out that the fact that hypocrisy is a moral fault does not yet explain why hypocritical blame is standingless blame. She raises a challenge: one must explain what is distinct about hypocritical blame such that the hypocritical blamer lacks the standing to blame, even if the arrogant or petty blamer does not. Of those writing on hypocrisy, only we offer a direct response to Bell’s challenge. Recently, however, our account has come under criticism. We argue here that (1) our account can handle these criticisms and that (2) no other rival account adequately addresses Bell’s challenge of explaining what is uniquely objectionable about hypocritical blame. Because answering Bell’s challenge is a necessary component of any plausible account of the relationship between hypocrisy and standing, our account remains the best on offer.

中文翻译：

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虚伪的罪魁祸首

人们普遍认为，伪善会破坏一个人应受谴责的道德地位。根据关于资格的非伪条件，只有当R对于违反N的责任不是虚伪时，R才有资格责备其他代理人S违反某些规范N。然而，很少有人提出这种条件。麦卡莱斯特·贝尔指出，伪善是一种道德过失，这一事实尚未解释为什么伪善的指责是无休止的指责。她提出了一个挑战：必须解释伪善罪的独特之处，以使伪善罪人缺乏应受谴责的地位，即使傲慢或小罪人没有。在那些关于伪善的著作中，只有我们对贝尔的挑战提供了直接的回应。但是，最近，我们的说法受到了批评。我们在这里辩称，（1）我们的陈述可以处理这些批评，并且（2）没有其他竞争者的陈述足以应对贝尔提出的解释伪善责备的唯一异议的挑战。因为回答贝尔的挑战是对虚伪和声望之间任何合理的叙述的必要组成部分，所以我们的叙述仍然是最好的。