ABSTRACT Korean chaebol firms, characterized by excessive debt financing and overinvestment, experienced restructuring after the 1997 crisis. By reducing debt financing and thus overinvestment, they tried to reorganize financing structure and ownership structure. Chaebols’ debt reduction turns out to have improved performance. However, polarization between chaebol and non-chaebol firms has become more significant. Even after the crisis, firms that give higher cash flows to a controlling shareholder take more capital investment, indicating that agency problems still exist within chaebols. Chaebol-affiliated firms continue to be more active in R&D than non-chaebol firms. However, the pattern is limited to the group of top 10 chaebols after the crisis. Abbreviations: KFTC: Korea Fair Trade Commission

中文翻译：

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1997年金融危机后的财阀重组如何影响韩国的公司决策和业绩：债务融资，所有权结构和投资

摘要以债务债务过多和投资过度为特征的韩国财阀公司在1997年危机后经历了重组。通过减少债务融资，从而减少了过度投资，他们试图重组融资结构和所有权结构。Chaebols的减债事实证明表现有所改善。但是，财阀公司与非财阀公司之间的两极分化变得更加明显。即使在危机过后，向控股股东提供更高现金流量的公司也会进行更多的资本投资，这表明在财阀内部仍然存在代理问题。与chaebol关联的公司在研发方面继续比非chaebol的公司活跃。但是，这种模式仅限于危机发生后的十大财阀集团。缩写：KFTC：韩国公平贸易委员会