In her article “Courage and Passion in the Reading of the Later Foucault of the Cynics” Inmaculada Hoyos Sánchez aims to determine what role the passions played in the courage of the truth of ancient Cynicism, for which purpose she analyses the lectures Foucault gave at the Collège de France in 1984. The hypothesis put forward in this article is that what makes Cynic courage different from other manifestations of the courage of the truth, such as Socratic courage, is that it specifically involves the eradication of shame, a passion that is social and public in character, rather than an overcoming of the fear of dying. Thus, Cynical askesis, on which courage is based, entails work not only on the passions themselves but on all the passions of humanity, so that Cynic courage points to another world. In the final part of the study, the author poses an open question as to whether the courage of the truth can or cannot be an active affective force. Inmaculada Hoyos Sánchez, "Courage and Passion in the Reading of the Later Foucault on the Cynics " page 2 of 8 CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 20.4 (2018): Special Issue Processes of Subjectivation: Biopolitics and Politics of Literature. Ed. Azucena G. Blanco Inmaculada HOYOS SÁNCHEZ Courage and Passion in the Reading of the Later Foucault of the Cynics What modes of relation can be found between the courage of the truth and the passions? This is the question that this study wishes to raise, building on the lectures Foucault gave at the Collège de France in 1984. I propose, therefore, to analyse those lectures, paying particular attention to the interpretation the French thinker makes of the ancient Cynics. In classical Cynicism, according to Foucault, the courage of the truth is expressed in a more radical and complex way as it is incorporated into the mode of life, and, to this extent, as I understand it, we can find in Cynicism an especially fertile way to tackle the question through the connections between courage of the truth, passions and affects. Of course, not only ancient Cynicism posed the important question of the courage of the truth. In his lectures, Foucault refers to a certain courage of a political nature that was exemplified by Solon, and to Socratic, ethical parrhēsia. We can also find an interesting reflection on the negative evaluation that courage is given by Christian literature, such as in Sayings of the Fathers, which consider this courage, from the standpoint of defending obedience to and fear of God, as arrogance and a lack of respect. In modernity, Spinoza maintained the thesis that courage—or fortitude, which was the term he preferred— is an active and rational affect, contrary to fear and stronger than it insofar as it conquers it or overcomes it. In the Scholium to Proposition 10 of Book V of his Ethics, Spinoza considers that “to put aside fear we must in the same way reflect on resoluteness, often describing and imagining the common dangers of life, and how they can be best avoided and overcome by presence of mind and strength of character” (365). Spinozan courage or fortitude (fortitudo), which is divided into resoluteness (animositas) and nobility (generositas), is an affect certainly active or rational, which supposes knowledge and rational transformation of our passions so that, using the power of joy we defeat, as far as is possible, sorrow (Spinoza, Ethics 102). Nietzsche also shows in Ecce homo that courage is the power of life to affirm to oneself, a surplus of strength that takes us closer to the truth (85). Paul Tillich also states in The Courage to Be that this “is the ethical act in which man affirms his own being in spite of those elements of his existence which conflict with his essential self-affirmation” (3). We thus see that in these three cases, courage seems to be thought of as a force that brings us closer to a truth of ethical nature, or even a force or power that is itself rational, an active rational affect. Foucault also indicates in his last lectures given at the Collège de France that between courage and truth there is a fundamental connection that can be expressed in various ways. The question is what role the passions play in those different expressions of the courage of the truth. Is that courage a passion, a power, a force or even an active rational affect? There is no one answer to this question. Not even Plato in the Laches was able to say of what courage truly consists: “We have not discovered the true nature of courage,” Socrates says (143; qtd. in Foucault 150). Foucault emphasizes this and states that to deal with these questions we must first determine the different modes in which the courage of the truth has appeared in history. In this study, as I have stated earlier, I will focus above all on the distinctive characteristics of Cynical courage. Nevertheless, before starting I would like to stress the ways in which this problem is situated methodologically in Foucault’s thought, and the way it fits in with the triple theoretical shift that he operates, from the theme of knowledge to that of veridiction, from the theme of domination to that of governmentality, and from the theme of the individual to that of the practices of self. Hence it is a question, as Foucault himself stated, of “studying the relations between truth, power, and subject without ever reducing each of them to the others.” (9) If we think of how Cynical courage can be expressed in these three spheres, we can say, firstly, that the courage of the truth is embodied in the life of the Cynic as a form of veridiction that involves harmony not only between what one thinks, says and does, but also between the truth and the body. The Cynic is the visible statue of the truth. Secondly, it involves a labor of knowledge, esteem and care of the self, of others and of the world, through which the Cynic constitutes himself as the moral subject of his behaviour, and the world becomes other (third aspect: ēthos). The question I try to tackle in the text is what relation or function the passions undertake in this triple dimension of the courage of the truth characteristic of the Cynics. In Foucault’s Collège de France lecture of February 1st, 1984, he states that for there to be parrhēsia, in the truth act there needs to be a questioning of the relation between the two interlocutors. Courage is one of the necessary conditions of parrhēsia, as Daniele Lorenzini has also indicated in his study on the seven characteristics—absence of codified effect, freedom of the individual speaking, criticism, dangerousness, courageousness, transparency, and alethurgy – that make it possible to distinguish the act of parrhēsia from other acts of speaking that could also fall under the denomination of speaking true (“Performative”). Parrhēsia entails, therefore, a certain form of courage, whose minimal form consists Inmaculada Hoyos Sánchez, "Courage and Passion in the Reading of the Later Foucault on the Cynics " page 3 of 8 CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 20.4 (2018): Special Issue Processes of Subjectivation: Biopolitics and Politics of Literature. Ed. Azucena G. Blanco of the fact that the parrhesiast runs the risk of undoing the relation with the other that was precisely what enabled his discourse; and whose maximum form resides in confronting the danger in which the parrhesiast puts his own life by saying what he says. In this case, Foucault refers to Plato and his speaking truth to Dionysius the Elder. However, it is important to highlight that parrhēsia involves a certain form of courage not only in the parrhesiast but also in the receiver of this spoken truth. Foucault says that at the core of the parrhesiastic game there is a pact by which the receiver of the truth (a people, king, tyrant, prince or friend) also possesses the courage to accept it, however offensive it may be for the passions or own interests. Therefore, the first aspect that I wish to highlight is that this double courage of the truth entails “greatness of soul,” an uplifting with respect to the passions or own interests both in the one who says and in the one who listens to the truth (Foucault 12). It is therefore a question of specifying what passions need to be overcome, because in this way we can elucidate the differences of Cynical parrhēsia compared to the Socratic. In the case of Socratic parrhēsia, Foucault emphasises the idea that the courage of the truth in Socrates involves an overcoming, or more accurately an elimination, of the fear of dying. It is not, therefore, that courage entails overcoming all fear, but one in particular, the fear of death itself. In the Apology, Socrates prefers death to betraying his task, that is, the care of others and of the self. It is also the importance of carrying out this function that explains, according to Foucault, why Socrates moved away from the political forum and instead exercised an ethical parrhēsia. What Socrates fears is not death but not performing his function. If he devoted himself to politics then they would kill him and he would not be able to undertake the care of self and of others. And this is what matters, not death. (Foucault 80-81. For a comparison between this Socratic overcoming of the fear of dying, and that of Foucault himself, see Frédéric Gros, “Course Context” 347-48). What are the passions, the interests, that the Cynics would have to overcome to embody in their own lives the courage of the truth? In this case, it seems that it is not only a question of overcoming the fear of death but above all of getting rid of shame, the fear of public ridicule, of the unconventional. And this partly explains what the singularity of Cynicism is and why Foucault ends up coming to it in the last stage of his thought. In the lecture of February 29th, 1984, and in the framework of reflecting on the relation betwee

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愤世嫉俗者后来的福柯的阅读中的勇气和激情

Inmaculada HoyosSánchez在她的文章“对后来的犬儒主义者的阅读中的热情和热情”中，旨在确定激情在古代犬儒主义真相的勇气中扮演了什么角色，为此，她分析了福柯在1984年，法兰西学院（Collègede France）。本文提出的假设是，使Cynic的勇气与真理的其他勇气表现形式（例如，苏格拉底勇气）不同的是，它特别涉及消除耻辱感，这是一种社会性的激情和公开的性格，而不是克服对死亡的恐惧。因此，勇气所基于的愤世嫉俗的抱负不仅需要对激情本身进行努力，而且还需要对人类的所有激情进行工作，因此愤世嫉俗的勇气指向了另一个世界。在研究的最后部分，作者对真理的勇气能否成为积极的情感力量提出了一个开放的问题。Inmaculada HoyosSánchez，“对犬儒主义者后来的福柯的阅读中的勇气和热情”，第8页，第2页CLCWeb：比较文学与文化20.4（2018）：主体化的特殊过程：生物政治与文学政治。埃德 Azucena G. Blanco Inmaculada HOYOSSÁNCHEZ在对犬儒主义者后来的福柯小说的阅读中表现出的勇气和激情在真理的勇气和激情之间可以找到什么关系？这是本研究希望在福柯1984年在法兰西学院举行的讲座的基础上提出的问题。因此，我建议对这些讲座进行分析，尤其要注意法国思想家对古代犬儒主义者的解释。在福柯看来，在古典犬儒主义中，真理的勇气以更为激进和复杂的方式表达出来，因为它被纳入了生活模式，而且据我所知，在犬儒主义中，我们发现通过勇气，真相，情感和情感之间的联系来解决问题的一种特别肥沃的方式。当然，不仅古代犬儒主义提出了真相勇气的重要问题。在他的演讲中，福柯指的是某种具有政治性质的勇气，例如索伦（Solon）所代表的那种勇气，以及苏格拉底的道德上的痛苦。我们还可以从消极的评价中找到有趣的思考，即基督教文学给予了勇气，例如在《父亲的话》中，从捍卫对上帝的敬畏和敬畏的立场，认为这种勇气是自大和缺乏敬畏精神。尊重。在现代性中，斯宾诺莎坚持以下论点：勇气-或坚韧，这是他偏爱的术语-是积极而理性的影响，在克服或克服恐惧方面与恐惧相反并且比恐惧更强大。斯宾诺莎在他的《道德准则》第五卷的第10条命题中，认为“撇开恐惧，我们必须以同样的方式反思坚决，经常描述和想象生活中的常见危险，以及如何最好地避免和克服这些危险。的存在和品格的力量”（365）。Spinozan的勇气或毅力（fortitudo），分为坚毅（animositas）和贵族（generositas），是一种肯定是积极的或理性的情感，它需要知识和对我们激情的理性转化，以便利用我们击败的喜悦的力量，尽可能地感到悲伤（Spinoza，道德102）。尼采在埃切斯·霍姆（Ecce homo）中也表明，勇气是生命自我肯定的力量，力量的剩余使我们更接近真理（85）。保罗·提里奇（Paul Tillich）在《勇于成为》中也指出，“这是一种道德行为，尽管人类存在的某些因素与他的基本自我肯定相冲突，但人类仍在肯定自己的存在”（3）。因此，我们看到在这三种情况下，勇气似乎被认为是一种使我们更接近道德本质真理的力量，或者甚至是一种本身是理性的，积极的理性影响的力量。福柯还在法国学院的上一次演讲中指出，在勇气与真理之间存在着可以用各种方式表达的基本联系。问题是，激情在真理勇气的这些不同表达中起什么作用。这是一种勇气，一种激情，一种力量，力量还是积极的理性影响？这个问题没有答案。苏格拉底说：“甚至我们的勇气中的柏拉图都无法说出真正的勇气是什么：”我们还没有发现勇气的真正本质，（143；《福柯杂志》第40期）。福柯强调了这一点，并指出，要解决这些问题，我们必须首先确定在历史上出现勇气的不同方式。正如我之前所说，在这项研究中，我将首先关注愤世嫉俗的勇气的独特特征。不过，在开始之前，我想强调一下这个问题在方法论上如何定位于福柯的思想，以及与他所进行的从知识主题到验证论的三重理论转变相适应的方式，从统治的主题到政府的主题，从个人的主题到自我实践的主题。因此，正如福柯本人所说，这是一个问题，即“研究真理，权力和主体之间的关系，而又从来没有将它们之间的关系缩小。” （9）如果我们考虑如何在这三个领域中表现出愤世嫉俗的勇气，我们可以说，首先，真理的勇气体现在犬儒主义者的生活中，是一种形式的验证，不仅涉及事物之间的和谐。一个人在思考，说和做，而且也在真理与身体之间。犬儒主义是可见的真理雕像。其次，它涉及到对自我，他人和世界的知识，自尊和关怀的劳动，犬儒主义者通过这种劳动将自己构成自己的行为的道德主体，而世界变成了另一世界（第三方面：ēthos）。我在本文中试图解决的问题是，在愤世嫉俗的人的真实性勇气的这个三重维度中，激情承担了什么关系或功能。在1984年2月1日福柯在法国大专院校的演讲中，他指出，要想出现腹泻，实际上，就必须对两个对话者之间的关系提出质疑。正如丹尼尔·洛伦兹尼（Daniele Lorenzini）在研究七个特征时一样，勇气是腹泻的必要条件之一，这七个特征是：缺乏编纂的效果，个人言论自由，批评，危险，勇气，透明，和性欲低落–使得有可能将Parrhēsia行为与其他也属于真实口语（“表现”）范畴的口头行为区分开来。因此，Parrhēsia需要某种形式的勇气，其最小形式包括Inmaculada HoyosSánchez，“对愤世嫉俗的人阅读后来的福柯小说时的勇气与激情”，共8页CLCWeb：比较文学与文化20.4（2018）：主体化的特殊过程：生物政治与文学政治。埃德 Azucena G. Blanco认为，parrhesiast冒着破坏与另一方关系的风险，而正是这种关系使他的话语成为现实；他最大的形式在于面对parrhesiast通过说出自己的话来摆出自己的生命的危险。在这种情况下，福柯指的是柏拉图，而他的讲真话则是指老年狄俄尼修斯。但是，重要的是要强调，腹痛不仅在旁白者中而且在这种口头真理的接受者中都包含某种形式的勇气。福柯说，在稀缺性游戏的核心是一个契约，通过它，真理的接受者（人民，国王，暴君，王子或朋友）也有勇气接受真理，然而，冒犯性可能是出于热情或自身利益。因此，我要强调的第一个方面是，对真理的这种双重勇气需要“灵魂的伟大”，这既使说者和听真理的人在激情或自身利益方面都得到提升（福柯12）。因此，这是一个具体说明需要克服哪些激情的问题，因为通过这种方式，我们可以阐明愤世嫉俗的疼痛与苏格拉底的区别。对于苏格拉底式的腹泻，福柯强调了这样一个观念，即苏格拉底式的真理勇气涉及克服或更确切地说是消除对死亡的恐惧。因此，勇气并不是要克服所有恐惧，而是要特别克服对死亡本身的恐惧。在道歉中 苏格拉底更喜欢死亡，而不是出卖自己的任务，也就是关心他人和自我。根据福柯的观点，履行这一职能的重要性也解释了苏格拉底为何离开政治论坛而代之以道德上的痛苦。苏格拉底担心的不是死亡，而是没有履行职责。如果他献身于政治，那么他们就会杀了他，而他将无法承担起照顾自己和他人的责任。这才是重要的，而不是死亡。（福柯80-81。关于苏格拉底式的对死亡恐惧的克服与福柯本人之间的比较，请参见弗雷德里克·格罗斯，《课程背景》 347-48）。犬儒主义者要在自己的生活中体现真理的勇气，必须克服哪些激情和利益？在这种情况下，看来，这不仅是克服对死亡的恐惧的问题，而且最重要的是摆脱对非常规的耻辱，对公众的嘲笑的恐惧。这在一定程度上解释了犬儒主义的奇异之处，以及为什么福柯在他的思想的最后阶段最终陷入困境。在1984年2月29日的演讲中，以及在思考关系之间的框架中