universalism and computational intelligence (Negarestani), or automation and Promethean design (Bratton). This is not to say that scientists, social scientists, and humanists have not been assembled in recent years to address the limitations of the computational sciences. An excellent example is the edited collection, Beyond Mechanism: Putting Life Back into Biology (Henning and Scarfe). At the center of this work is a commitment to using the underlying principles of process philosophy (and related conceptions) as the basis for addressing what computational practices have so far been unable to explain: in particular, the self in biological self-organization. On the one hand, it is remarkable that theoretical biologists are drawing (and not superficially) on Whitehead, Peirce, and even Kant for conceptual clarity. But on the other hand, the topics they explore are circumscribed by the presupposed relevance of a process-based metaphysics of life. What’s more, continental genealogies of nonhuman process, ecology, and subjectivity are entirely missing from the collection. Other collections and volumes have attempted to explore similar themes, most notably, Life and Process: Towards a New Biophilosophy (Koutroufinis), but here too we find the already-presumed sufficiency of process philosophy, and a complete lack of engagement with other conceptual histories. Instead, the work done in the OPG meetings, and showcased in this issue, revolves around a genuine concern for scientific styles of reasoning, and in particular for the problems, concerns, and assumptions that animate scientific work. (Here, for example, a problem internal to the discipline of biology – the fact, as Denis Noble has suggested, that for decades theoretical biologists and experimental biologists have had almost nothing to say to each other – has stakes and implications that can be better illuminated, perhaps, from outside the discipline itself, when philosophy and anthropology shed light on what counts as “real” “science” and how that, in turn, overdetermines what counts as “life” (Noble 169, 235–37).) And what emerges from this engagement is not the ascendance of a new transcendental principle or (what amounts to the same thing) foundational bedrock, derived from the physico-mathematical sciences, but just the opposite: that theorists working in these scientific fields are searching for conceptual frameworks that can express the fact that certain material and energetic systems (living systems) exceed the computational and conceptual systems designed to understand them, a domain in which the ontological and the epistemological domains enter into a zone of strange (and unavoidable) entanglement. wolfe and nocek

中文翻译：

---

超越复杂性的个体发育

普遍主义和计算智能（Negarestani），或自动化和普罗米修斯设计（Bratton）。这并不是说近年来科学家、社会科学家和人文主义者没有聚集起来解决计算科学的局限性。一个很好的例子是经过编辑的合集，超越机制：将生命恢复到生物学中（Henning 和 Scarfe）。这项工作的核心是致力于使用过程哲学（和相关概念）的基本原则作为解决计算实践迄今无法解释的基础：特别是生物自组织中的自我。一方面，值得注意的是，理论生物学家正在（而不是肤浅地）借鉴怀特黑德、皮尔斯甚至康德的概念，以求概念清晰。但另一方面，他们探索的主题受到基于过程的生命形而上学的预设相关性的限制。更重要的是，非人类过程、生态学和主观性的大陆系谱完全从收藏中消失了。其他收藏和卷册试图探索类似的主题，最显着的是生命与过程：迈向新的生物哲学（Koutroufinis），但在这里我们也发现过程哲学已经假定足够，并且完全缺乏与其他概念历史的接触. 相反，在 OPG 会议上完成并在本期中展示的工作围绕着对科学推理方式的真正关注，尤其是对激发科学工作活力的问题、关注点和假设的关注。（例如，这里有一个生物学学科内部的问题——事实，在这些科学领域工作的理论家正在寻找能够表达这样一个事实的概念框架，即某些物质和能量系统（生命系统）超出了旨在理解它们的计算和概念系统，本体论和认识论领域进入的领域一个奇怪的（不可避免的）纠缠区域。沃尔夫和诺西克