ABSTRACT As the crisis in the Sudan unfolded after the overthrow of long time President Omar al-Bashir, the Director of the East African Standby Force (EASF) purportedly made a statement to the effect that the force was ready to intervene should the situation become genocidal. Using the case of its failed intervention in Burundi crisis, this article argues that the EASF deployment in the Sudan would generally not be feasible for reasons including: the government of the Sudan would not consent to the intervention; the ongoing dialogue between the warring parties would preclude any intervention; and the lack of capacity of the force to actually deploy. From its failed deployment in Burundi, these lessons can be discerned: first, that for any deployment of the EASF to be authorised, the policy organs especially of the AU must be aligned in their understanding of the situation. Secondly, where there are alternative means of dealing with the situation, military intervention would not be authorised. Lastly, that consent of the host state must be procured before deployment is undertaken out of respect for the principle of sovereignty.

中文翻译：

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东非待命部队（EASF）在苏丹的“推测”干预：从其在布隆迪部署失败的教训

摘要 随着长期总统奥马尔·巴希尔 (Omar al-Bashir) 被推翻后苏丹的危机不断扩大，东非待命部队 (EASF) 的负责人据称发表声明说，如果局势演变成种族灭绝，该部队准备进行干预。 . 本文以干预布隆迪危机失败为例，认为EASF在苏丹的部署一般不可行，原因包括：苏丹政府不同意干预；交战各方之间正在进行的对话将排除任何干预；以及部队缺乏实际部署的能力。从其在布隆迪的失败部署中，可以看出这些教训：首先，对于任何部署 EASF 的授权，政策机构，尤其是非盟的政策机构必须对形势的理解保持一致。其次，如果有其他处理方法，则不会授权军事干预。最后，出于对主权原则的尊重，在部署之前必须获得东道国的同意。