ABSTRACT This article seeks to address a policy quandary: despite Nigeria’s history of oil exploitation since 1956 and institutionalization of the Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI) in 2004, why has the country not been able to address the resource wealth–poverty dilemma? Is it that the EITI’s governance model is too Western to address Nigeria’s resource curse? It has been established that a country’s propensity to integrate EITI principles in the oil industry is largely dependent not only on the existence of institutions, but also on the level of institutional development. Norway and Nigeria both created policy and regulatory systems. Norway’s more competent administrative structures grew into a self-regulatory system but, by contrast, Nigeria’s indigenous civil service never developed institutional arrangements sufficient to integrate the oil industry into the entire national or regional institutional framework. Considering these historical and contextual differences between Nigeria and Norway, this article employs ‘stakeholder analysis’ to construct a framework of ‘thinking’ regarding how the oil sector could be effectively governed in Nigeria (Figure 7), a country with a robust civil society but a complex political system: in such countries, evolution of what I call a ‘self-reinforcing system of institutional incompatibility’ is inevitable, but institutionalization of foreign models such as EITI is often difficult to achieve.

中文翻译：

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从资源诅咒到体制不相容：尼日利亚和挪威石油资源治理的比较研究

摘要本文旨在解决一个政策难题：尽管尼日利亚自1956年以来就有石油开采历史，并且在2004年将尼日利亚采掘业透明度倡议（NEITI）体制化，但为什么该国仍无法解决资源财富与贫困的困境？EITI的治理模式是否过于西方以至于无法解决尼日利亚的资源诅咒？已经确定，一个国家在石油工业中整合EITI原则的倾向在很大程度上不仅取决于机构的存在，而且还取决于机构的发展水平。挪威和尼日利亚都建立了政策和监管体系。挪威比较称职的行政机构发展成为一个自我监管的系统，但相比之下，尼日利亚的土著公务员制度从未制定过足以将石油业纳入整个国家或地区体制框架的体制安排。考虑到尼日利亚和挪威之间的这些历史和背景差异，本文利用“利益相关者分析”构建了一个关于如何有效地管理尼日利亚石油业的“思考”框架（图7），尼日利亚是一个公民社会健全但一个复杂的政治体系：在这样的国家中，我所谓的“体制不相容的自我强化体系”的发展是不可避免的，但是诸如EITI之类的外国模式的制度化往往很难实现。