As Gelman and Azari make clear, there is no single smoking gun to point to as the primary explanation for the 2016 election that took somany of us by surprise. As a pollster at a progressive public opinion research firm, I will admit the election floored me in the most depressing and sickening of ways. It was not because I did not think it was possible. In fact, in the final weeks leading up to the election, I and many of my colleagues grew increasingly fearful that the tightening we saw in internal polls meant that aClinton victorywas far from certain. But I letmyself be reassured by the confidence of the analytics projections. One of the most important lessons practitioners and consumers of public opinion research can learn from this experience is to take a much closer examination of election prediction models (lesson #3) and how nonresponse bias (lesson #5) affects polls in general and the polls that feed into forecast models. And finally, we cannot let ourselves get so fixated on the horserace numbers that we forget to listen to what voters are actually telling us in the rest of the poll and in qualitative research.

中文翻译：

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对Gelman和Azari（2017）的回应

正如盖尔曼（Gelman）和阿扎里（Azari）明确指出的那样，没有任何一支烟枪可以作为2016年大选的主要解释。作为进步的民意调查公司的民意测验者，我将承认选举以最令人沮丧和令人作呕的方式使我受挫。这不是因为我认为不可能。实际上，在选举前的最后几周，我和我的许多同事变得越来越担心，我们在内部民意测验中看到的紧缩政策意味着克林顿的胜利远未定。但是我对分析预测的信心感到放心。从实践中可以学到的最重要的课程从业者和消费者研究者之一，就是要仔细研究选举预测模型（第3课）以及无回应偏差（第5课）如何影响民意测验和民意测验。进入预测模型。最后，我们不能让自己对赛马数字过于关注，以至于我们忘记听选民在其余民意测验和定性研究中实际上告诉我们的事情。