The appropriateness, or acceptability, of a conditional does not just ‘go with’ the corresponding conditional probability. A condition of dependence is required as well (cf. Douven in Synthese 164:19–44, 2008, The epistemology of indicative conditionals. Formal and empirical approaches. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016; Skovgaard-Olsen et al. in Cognition 150:26–36, 2016). In this paper a particular notion of dependence is proposed. It is shown that under both a forward causal and a backward evidential (or diagnostic) reading of the conditional, this appropriateness condition reduces to conditional probability under some natural circumstances. Because this is in particular the case for the so-called diagnostic reading of the conditional, this analysis might help to explain some of Douven and Verbrugge’s (Cognition 117:302–318, 2010) empirical observations.

中文翻译：

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条件、因果关系和条件概率

条件的适当性或可接受性不仅仅与相应的条件概率“一致”。依赖条件也是必需的（参见 Douven in Synthese 164:19–44, 2008, The epittemology of indicator conditionals. Formal and Experimental Methods. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016; Skovgaard-Olsen et al. in Cognition 150 :26–36, 2016)。在本文中，提出了一个特殊的依赖概念。结果表明，在条件的前向因果和后向证据（或诊断）阅读下，这种适当性条件在某些自然情况下降低为条件概率。因为对于条件句的所谓诊断阅读尤其如此，所以这种分析可能有助于解释 Douven 和 Verbrugge 的一些（认知 117：302-318，