The objective of this article is to critically examine the regulatory framework associated with reclamation bonding mechanism in Indonesia. It suggests that the failure of the Indonesian reclamation bonding mechanism is due to a lack of regulatory clarity and the consequent weaknesses in law enforcement. In this context, this article reviews the existing literature on policy models pertaining to bonding mechanisms before arriving at the conclusion that the worst-case scenario described by Costanza and others (2015) represents the most apt remedy to improve Indonesia's reclamation bonding mechanism policy. Under a worst-case scenario bonding mechanism, the bond value is set up according to the costs associated with the most extensive probable environmental destruction. Such costs are over and above those associated with identified environmental damage. Companies intending to conduct mining activities are required to provide such a bond upfront, prior to commencing their exploration and operation–production.

本文的目的是批判性地审查与印度尼西亚填海结合机制相关的监管框架。它表明印度尼西亚填海联合机制的失败是由于缺乏监管清晰度以及随之而来的执法薄弱。在此背景下，本文回顾了与担保机制相关的政策模型的现有文献，然后得出结论，即 Costanza 等人（2015 年）描述的最坏情况是改善印度尼西亚填海担保机制政策的最恰当的补救措施。在最坏情况下的债券机制下，债券价值是根据与最广泛可能的环境破坏相关的成本确定的。此类成本超出了与已确定的环境损害相关的成本。打算开展采矿活动的公司必须在开始勘探和生产运营之前预先提供此类保证金。