In this article, we examine the economic and welfare ramifications of antitrust policy intervention in primary- and secondary-line price discrimination in a distribution channel where downstream retailers are vertically related through a strategic upstream manufacturer. Particularly, we focus on a distribution channel where a manufacturer sells his product through retailers in two asymmetric markets. The markets are asymmetric along two dimensions: One exhibits a higher demand/profit potential than does the other; and one is a competitive market where two retailers engage in imperfect price competition, whereas the other is a captive market monopolized by one of the retailers. We characterize the effect of antitrust policy intervention in each form of third-degree price discrimination on the pricing and selling mechanisms of channel members, consumers, and the channel profits (and hence on the total welfare) for varying degrees of asymmetry on demand potential between the two markets and the extent of product substitutability. We show that under practical demand and competition conditions, contrary to prior literature, antitrust policy intervention in secondary-line discrimination always benefits the local retailer (the disfavored customer of the manufacturer) and yet is apt to result in a lose–win or lose–lose outcome in addition to a win–win outcome for the channel and society. Second, antitrust policy intervention in primary-line discrimination so as to protect a localized retailer from the selective price cuts of a chain-store retailer (rather than to protect competition) can actually result in a win–win outcome. Third, in the absence of antitrust policy intervention, consumers are always harmed by (discriminatory) pricing practices employed in a channel. Those and other findings contribute to the intense debate over the merits and goals of antitrust policy intervention in third-degree price discrimination in distribution channels by shedding some light on the contractual relationships between manufacturers and retailers and economic forces at play.

中文翻译：

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反垄断政策干预对分销渠道定价策略的影响

在本文中，我们研究了在下游零售商通过战略性上游制造商垂直关联的分销渠道中，反垄断政策干预一级和二级价格歧视的经济和福利后果。特别是，我们专注于制造商通过两个不对称的零售商销售其产品的分销渠道市场。市场在两个方面是不对称的：一个比另一个表现出更高的需求/利润潜力；一个是两个零售商进行不完全价格竞争的竞争市场，另一个是一个零售商垄断的自保市场。我们描述了反垄断政策干预每种形式的三级价格歧视对渠道成员、消费者的定价和销售机制的影响，以及渠道利润（以及因此对总福利）的不同程度的需求潜力不对称两个市场和产品可替代性的程度。我们表明，在实际需求和竞争条件下，与先前的文献相反，除了渠道和社会的双赢结果之外，双赢或双输的结果。其次，反垄断政策干预一线歧视以保护本地零售商免受连锁零售商选择性降价的影响（而不是保护竞争）实际上可以带来双赢结果。第三，在没有反垄断政策干预的情况下，消费者总是受到渠道中采用的（歧视性）定价做法的伤害。这些和其他调查结果揭示了制造商和零售商之间的合同关系以及起作用的经济力量，从而引发了关于反垄断政策干预分销渠道三级价格歧视的优点和目标的激烈辩论。