We show that the descendants of ancient farmers may have an interest in marrying among themselves, and thus maintaining the gendered division of labour originally justified on comparative-advantage grounds by the advent of the plough, even after they emigrate to a modern industrial economy where individual productivity depends on education rather than physical characteristics. The result rests on the argument that, if efficiency requires the more productive spouse to specialize in raising income, and the less productive one in raising children, irrespective of gender, an efficient domestic equilibrium will be implemented by a costlessly enforceable pre-marital contract stipulating that the husband should do the former and the wife the latter. A contract may not be needed, however, if time spent with children gives direct utility, because an efficient equilibrium may then be characterized by little or no division of labour.

我们表明，古代农民的后代可能有兴趣在彼此之间结婚，从而通过耕作的出现保持原本在比较优势的理由下原本正当的性别分工，即使他们移民到了现代工业经济中，生产力取决于教育而不是身体特征。结果基于以下论点：如果效率要求配偶中生产能力更高的配偶专门从事收入的增长，而在抚养孩子方面效率较低的配偶，而不考虑性别，则将通过无价可执行的婚前合同规定实现有效的家庭平衡。丈夫应由前者承担，妻子应由后者承担。也许不需要签订合同，但是，如果与孩子在一起的时间可以直接产生效用，