The paper examines political economy consequences of a third party (World Bank) intervention in India. The intervention was a capacity building initiative that trained local politicians in various governance procedures in a sample of villages. We show that the state government reacted to the intervention by allocating additional resources to program villages with aligned incumbents. Consequently, party switching by opposition incumbents in favor of the ruling party went up significantly in program villages. Moreover, the reelection rate of opposition party incumbents went down due to the intervention, especially for those who didn’t switch parties. The results highlight the importance of considering political economy consequences of such interventions, even in countries not heavily reliant on foreign assistance, to better understand their overall welfare effects.

本文研究了第三方（世界银行）在印度干预的政治经济后果。干预是一项能力建设计划，该计划在一个村庄样本中对当地政客进行了各种治理程序的培训。我们表明，州政府对干预措施做出了反应，将更多资源分配给了具有统一责任的规划村庄。因此，党的反对派任职有利于执政党的开关上去程序村显著。此外，反对党现任议员的连任率下降由于干预，尤其是对于那些不换党的人。结果突出表明，即使在不十分依赖外国援助的国家中，也要考虑此类干预的政治经济后果，以更好地了解其总体福利影响。