Purpose

This paper aims to investigate the extent to which locating primary industry subsidiaries in politically unstable countries impacts their survival. The authors argue that foreign multinational enterprises in less stable political environments can shape policies that are impactful on the costs of operating in primary industries and avoid compliance with more stringent policies at home.

Design/methodology/approach

Using a sample of 753 primary sector investments of Japanese multinational enterprises during the period 1986 to 2013, the authors conduct a parametric survival analysis of the relationship between political stability and subsidiary survival.

Findings

Political instability has a slight, curvilinear relationship with subsidiary survival, such that both high and low stability are associated with lower exit hazard, while moderate levels of stability increased exit hazard. This nonlinear relationship is stronger for efficiency-seeking subsidiaries, and weaker for market-seeking subsidiaries.

Originality/value

This research contributes to the debate around the pros and cons of globalization by examining the extent to which firms benefit by offshoring primary sector investments to avoid more costly legal requirements at home. The results suggest that this non-market strategy should be mitigated through appropriate policy measures and provides evidence that those policies already implemented are effective.

中文翻译：

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利用制度弱点？第一产业的政治稳定与外资子公司生存

目的

本文旨在调查在政治不稳定的国家设立初级产业子公司对其生存的影响程度。作者认为，政治环境不太稳定的外国跨国企业可以制定影响初级产业运营成本的政策，并避免遵守更严格的国内政策。

设计/方法/方法

作者以1986-2013年间日本跨国企业的753个初级部门投资为样本，对政治稳定性与附属生存之间的关系进行了参数生存分析。

发现

政治不稳定与附属生存存在轻微的曲线关系，因此高稳定性和低稳定性都与较低的退出风险相关，而中等水平的稳定性会增加退出风险。这种非线性关系对于寻求效率的子公司较强，对于寻求市场的子公司较弱。

原创性/价值

这项研究通过检查企业通过离岸初级部门投资以避免国内更高成本的法律要求而受益的程度，为围绕全球化利弊的辩论做出了贡献。结果表明，应通过适当的政策措施来缓解这种非市场战略，并提供证据表明那些已经实施的政策是有效的。