We introduce a competitive pollution permit market in a two-sector oligopoly equilibrium model. In this model, one commodity is inelastically supplied by one competitive trader and another one is produced by a finite set of oligopolists, using the first commodity as an input. The production of the second commodity is a polluting activity. We study both the competitive and oligopoly equilibria. We provide some conditions under which a supply subsidy given to the oligopolists that is financed by a tax on the competitive agent is Pareto-improving.

中文翻译：

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具有污染许可证的简单通用寡头均衡模型中的帕累托改进供应补贴

我们在两部门寡头垄断均衡模型中引入竞争性污染许可证市场。在此模型中，一个商品由一个竞争性商人非弹性地供应，而另一种商品则由有限的寡头垄断者生产，并使用第一种商品作为输入。第二种商品的生产是一种污染活动。我们研究竞争均衡和寡头垄断均衡。我们提供了一些条件，在这种情况下，通过对竞争性代理人征税资助的对寡头的供应补贴可以改善帕累托。