A 2017 terrorist attack in Manchester, UK, affected large numbers of adults and young people. During the response phase (first seven weeks), a multi-sector collaborative co-ordinated a decentralised response. In the subsequent recovery phase they implemented a centralised assertive outreach programme, ‘The Resilience Hub’, to screen and refer those affected. We present a process evaluation conducted after 1 year. Case study, involving a logic modelling approach, aggregate routine data, and semi-structured interviews topic guides based on the Inter-Agency Collaboration Framework and May’s Normalisation Process Theory. Leaders from health, education and voluntary sectors (n = 21) and frontline Resilience Hub workers (n = 6) were sampled for maximum variation or theoretically, then consented and interviewed. Framework analysis of transcripts was undertaken by two researchers. Devolved government, a collaborative culture, and existing clinical networks meant that, in the response phase, a collaboration was quickly established between health and education. All but one leader evaluated the response positively, although they were not involved in pre-disaster statutory planning. However, despite overwhelming positive feedback there were clear difficulties. (1) Some voluntary sector colleagues felt that it took some time for them to be involved. (2) Other VCSE organisations were accused of inappropriate, harmful use of early intervention. (3) The health sector were accused of overlooking those below the threshold for clinical treatment. (4) There was a perception that there were barriers to information sharing across organisations, which was particularly evident in relation to attempts to outreach to first responders and other professionals who may have been affected by the incident. (5) Hub workers encountered barriers to referring people who live outside of Greater Manchester. After 1 year of the recovery phase, 877 children and young people and 2375 adults had completed screening via the Resilience Hub, 79% of whom lived outside Greater Manchester. The psychosocial response to terrorist attacks and other contingencies should be planned and practiced before the event, including reviews of communications, protocols, data sharing procedures and workforce capacity. Further research is needed to understand how the health and voluntary sectors can best collaborate in the wake of future incidents.

中文翻译：

---

2017年曼彻斯特竞技场恐怖袭击的社会心理反应：过程评估

2017年在英国曼彻斯特发生的恐怖袭击影响了大批成年人和年轻人。在响应阶段（前七个星期），一个多部门协作协调了分散的响应。在随后的恢复阶段，他们实施了集中的自信外展计划“抗灾中心”，以筛查和转介受影响的人。我们提出1年后进行的过程评估。案例研究涉及逻辑建模方法，汇总的常规数据以及基于机构间协作框架和May的规范化过程理论的半结构化访谈主题指南。从卫生，教育和志愿部门的领导（n = 21）和一线抗灾中心工作人员（n = 6）中抽取样本，以获取最大差异或理论上的差异，然后征得他们的同意并接受采访。成绩单的框架分析由两名研究人员进行。权力下放的政府，协作的文化以及现有的临床网络意味着在响应阶段，卫生与教育之间的协作得以迅速建立。除了一名领导人以外，其他所有人都积极评价了该应对措施，尽管他们没有参与灾前法定计划。然而，尽管获得了压倒性的积极反馈，但仍然存在明显的困难。（1）一些志愿部门的同事认为他们需要一些时间才能参与其中。（2）其他VCSE组织被指控不适当地使用有害的早期干预措施。（3）卫生部门被指控忽视了低于临床治疗阈值的人群。（4）有人认为跨组织共享信息存在障碍，对于试图与可能受事件影响的第一响应者和其他专业人员进行联系的尝试，这一点尤其明显。（5）枢纽工人遇到了转介居住在大曼彻斯特以外地区的人的障碍。在恢复阶段的1年后，有877名儿童和年轻人以及2375名成年人已通过防灾中心完成了筛查，其中79％的人居住在大曼彻斯特以外。事件发生前应计划和实践对恐怖袭击和其他突发事件的社会心理反应，包括审查通信，协议，数据共享程序和员工能力。需要进一步的研究，以了解卫生和志愿部门在未来事件发生后如何最好地进行协作。