This paper uses register data to study how a particular age reward feature affects admission into two highly competitive study programs: medicine and law. The Norwegian admission system to higher education is centralized, and applicants compete in two quotas: one quota almost entirely based on grade point average from upper secondary education and one quota where students can compete with improved grades and where being older automatically increases the chance of acceptance, by awarding age points. For these study programs, we find that the admission system creates a waiting game, as gaining admission in the second quota is nearly impossible without accumulating a substantial amount of age points. If age predicts completion in higher education, this waiting game might be justified. However, if anything, we find the opposite to be true. Our paper suggests that age should carry less weight in admission decisions and that countries and/or higher education institutions should carefully consider how their admission system affects student incentives and how applicants are selected.

本文使用注册数据来研究特定年龄奖励功能如何影响进入两个竞争激烈的学习计划：医学和法律。挪威的高等教育录取系统是集中式的，申请人竞争两个配额：一个配额几乎完全基于高中学历的平均成绩，另一个配额可以让学生竞争更高的成绩，而年龄较大的则自动增加被录取的机会，通过奖励年龄点。对于这些学习计划，我们发现录取系统创建了一个等待游戏，因为要获得第二个配额的录取几乎是不可能的，而又不会积累大量的年龄点。如果年龄预示着高等教育的完成，那么这种等待的游戏可能是合理的。但是，如果有的话，我们发现事实恰恰相反。