The procurement of food grains by the government agencies under the Indian food program has been an important policy towards the achievement of self-reliance in food grains production. However, the rising food subsidy, especially in the last decade, including a skewed procurement pattern, raise various concerns before the policymakers. In this paper, an effort is made to provide a policy direction to move towards a balanced procurement plan across the states and to reduce the relevant operational cost. A game-theoretic model is formulated with three players: the central agency, a surplus state, and a deficit state for representation at three different levels. It has been found that a quantity-based incentive to the deficit state would address both the issues. The optimal incentive would depend on the amount of change in procurement in a state. However, beyond a threshold value, it would have no impact on the optimal incentive. Procurement cost parameters of the deficit state are more sensitive not only for the decrease in the relevant operational cost but also for the balanced procurement between the states. Besides, with a rise of the inter-state transportation cost, the scope of relevant operational cost reduction before the central agency increases.

政府机构在印度粮食计划下采购粮食是实现粮食自给自足的一项重要政策。但是，不断增加的粮食补贴，特别是在最近十年中，包括偏斜的采购模式，引起了政策制定者的各种关注。在本文中，我们努力提供政策方向，以朝着各州之间均衡的采购计划发展，并降低相关的运营成本。博弈论模型由三个参与者组成：中央机构，剩余状态和赤字状态，用于在三个不同级别上进行表示。已经发现，基于数量的赤字状态激励将解决这两个问题。最佳激励将取决于一个州的采购变化量。但是，超过阈值不会对最佳激励产生影响。赤字国家的采购成本参数不仅对相关运营成本的降低更为敏感，而且对各州之间的均衡采购也更为敏感。此外，随着州际运输成本的增加，在中央机构之前减少相关运营成本的范围也有所增加。