The purpose of this paper is to examine the empirical relationship between gray directors (non-executive non-independent directors) and executive compensation among companies listed in India’s National Stock Exchange (NSE). The paper also examines the possible interplay of relationships between controlling shareholder duality (controlling shareholder being the CEO), ownership category and executive compensation.,A sample of 438 firms listed in the NSE of India was studied using data spanning five financial years, 2012–2013 to 2016–2017.,Empirical evidence suggests that there is a positive association between the proportion of gray directors on the board and executive compensation. The sensitivity of executive compensation to gray directors is found to be higher among family controlled firms. This research has also found that CEOs who belong to controlling shareholder groups received higher pay than professional CEOs. The authors conjecture that these results suggest cronyism and may contribute to lower levels of corporate governance practices in the country.,The hybrid board structure, which India has adopted with the desire to bring the best of Anglo Saxon and Japanese board philosophies, has paradoxically led to self-serving boards. Exploration of alternative thinking to bring about changes in the regulatory framework is, therefore, necessary.,Serious problems are identified with the philosophy behind board composition mandated by Listing Requirements for Indian firms with empirical evidence showing how the existing rules generate cronyism and unfairness to minority shareholders.

中文翻译：

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印度公司中灰色董事与高管薪酬之间的关系

本文的目的是检验在印度国家证券交易所（NSE）上市的公司中，灰色董事（非执行非独立董事）与高管薪酬之间的经验关系。本文还研究了控股股东二重性（控股股东为首席执行官），所有权类别和高管薪酬之间可能存在的相互影响。2012年以来，印度NSE上市的438家公司的样本使用了五个财政年度的数据进行了研究2013年至2016年至2017年。经验证据表明，董事会的灰色董事比例与高管薪酬之间存在正相关关系。在家族控制的公司中，高管薪酬对灰色董事的敏感性更高。这项研究还发现，控股股东集团的首席执行官获得的薪资要高于专业首席执行官。作者推测，这些结果暗示了裙带关系，可能会导致该国较低水平的公司治理实践。印度采用混合董事会结构以期带动盎格鲁撒克逊人和日本董事会哲学的精华，这反而导致了矛盾。到自我服务的董事会。因此，有必要探索替代思维以改变监管框架。印度上市公司所要求的董事会组成背后的理念，已为严重的问题指明了印度公司，并有经验证据表明现有规则如何产生裙带关系和对少数群体的不公平股东。