This paper provides a demand-driven growth model of Kalecki’s (1943) political business cycle. It incorporates the three fundamental assumptions that govern Kalecki’s model: wage-led demand, the reserve army of labour effect, and the capitalists’ disproportionate power over fiscal policy. In our model, endogenous cycles are the outcome of the capitalists’ changing preferences over fiscal policy. The decreasing opposition to fiscal expansion by capitalists triggers the boom phase of the cycle, lest demand deficiency leads to a slowdown in accumulation. The downturn of the cycle is induced by the capitalists’ rising opposition to government spending, lest the workers’ growing political power at the peak of the cycle undermine their influence. This is unlike Goodwin and neoclassical PBC models, where a profit squeeze and the timing of elections or political ideologies determine cycles.

中文翻译：

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阶级冲突、财政政策和工资主导的需求：卡莱茨基政治经济周期模型

本文提供了 Kalecki (1943) 政治经济周期的需求驱动增长模型。它结合了支配卡莱茨基模型的三个基本假设：工资主导的需求、劳动力效应的后备军以及资本家对财政政策的不成比例的权力。在我们的模型中，内生周期是资本家改变对财政政策的偏好的结果。资本家对财政扩张的反对减弱触发了周期的繁荣阶段，以免需求不足导致积累放缓。资本家越来越反对政府支出，以免工人在周期顶峰时日益增长的政治权力削弱了他们的影响力，从而引发了周期的低迷。这与古德温和新古典 PBC 模型不同，