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Franchise fairs: A relevant signal in franchise choice in social activity
Contemporary Economics ( IF 2.4 ) Pub Date : 2016-09-30 , DOI: 10.5709/ce.1897-9254.215
Leonardo Martin Mastrangelo , Esther Calderon-Monge , Pilar Huerta-Zavala

Potential franchisees encounter difficulties in gaining knowledge about a franchise before embarking on their first start-up venture. For this reason, it is necessary to research which information signals help potential franchisees choose the franchise chains with which they wish to enter into business. Working within the framework of signaling theory, this study’s aim is to analyze the relationship between franchise choice and brand, price and participation in franchise fairs. The dynamic signaling model deployed to achieve the study´s aim draws on panel data methodology. This methodology allows us to analyze franchise chains over the period in which their parent franchises were using signaling to reveal information about their quality to potential franchisees. The results show that franchise fairs and up-front entry fees influence franchisee´s decisions. Therefore, it is concluded that potential franchisees prefer to garner information directly from franchise fairs, as opposed to heeding the other signals under study, and that when macroeconomic variables are exerting a strong influence on potential franchisees, up-front entry fees also constitute a signal that they consider. Finally, the managerial implications of the study are that franchise chains seeking franchisees should participate in franchise fairs to ensure that they are among the chosen franchises. Additionally, a franchisor should appropriately manage up-front entry fees as a signal, especially during periods of economic turmoil and recession.

中文翻译:

特许经营交易会:社会活动中特许经营选择的相关信号

潜在的特许经营商在开始他们的第一次创业之前,在获取特许经营知识方面遇到了困难。出于这个原因,有必要研究哪些信息信号可以帮助潜在的加盟商选择他们希望与之开展业务的特许经营连锁店。在信号理论的框架内,本研究的目的是分析特许经营选择与品牌、价格和加盟展会参与度之间的关系。为实现研究目标而部署的动态信号模型借鉴了面板数据方法。这种方法使我们能够分析特许连锁店在其母特许经营商使用信号向潜在特许经营商透露有关其质量的信息的时期内。结果表明,特许经营展览会和前期入场费会影响加盟商的决定。因此,得出的结论是,潜在加盟商更愿意直接从特许经营展中获取信息,而不是关注正在研究的其他信号,并且当宏观经济变量对潜在加盟商产生强烈影响时,前期入场费也构成了一个信号他们认为。最后,该研究的管理意义在于,寻求加盟商的特许经营连锁店应该参加特许经营展览会,以确保他们是被选中的特许经营商之一。此外,特许人应适当管理前期入场费作为信号,尤其是在经济动荡和衰退时期。得出的结论是,潜在的加盟商更愿意直接从特许经营展中获取信息,而不是关注正在研究的其他信号,并且当宏观经济变量对潜在加盟商产生强烈影响时,前期入场费也构成了一个信号,表明他们考虑。最后,该研究的管理意义在于,寻求加盟商的特许经营连锁店应该参加特许经营展览会,以确保他们是被选中的特许经营商之一。此外,特许人应适当管理前期入场费作为信号,尤其是在经济动荡和衰退时期。得出的结论是,潜在的加盟商更愿意直接从特许经营展中获取信息,而不是关注正在研究的其他信号,并且当宏观经济变量对潜在加盟商产生强烈影响时,前期入场费也构成了一个信号,表明他们考虑。最后,该研究的管理意义在于,寻求加盟商的特许经营连锁店应该参加特许经营展览会,以确保他们是被选中的特许经营商之一。此外,特许人应适当管理前期入场费作为信号,尤其是在经济动荡和衰退时期。预付费用也是他们考虑的一个信号。最后,该研究的管理意义在于,寻求加盟商的特许经营连锁店应该参加特许经营展览会,以确保他们是被选中的特许经营商之一。此外,特许人应适当管理前期入场费作为信号,尤其是在经济动荡和衰退时期。预付费用也是他们考虑的一个信号。最后,该研究的管理意义在于,寻求加盟商的特许经营连锁店应该参加特许经营展览会,以确保他们是被选中的特许经营商之一。此外,特许人应适当管理前期入场费作为信号,尤其是在经济动荡和衰退时期。
更新日期:2016-09-30
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