In reading closely a recent celebrated anthology on religious freedom, Politics of Religious Freedom (Danchin, Hurd, Mahmood and Sullivan, 2015), I found myself both highly stimulated and informed by the discussions therein, even when I found myself disagreeing. Yet, one irritating feature of the logic of discourse that turns up in this collection kept nagging at me. This would ordinarily be a small point but I believe the same oddity turns up in almost everything I have read about religious liberty. This is the failure to distinguish two senses of the term, “religious liberty.” The first sense refers to institutional freedom or sovereignty. I shall apply the convention, “freedom of religion” (FR) for this first sense of “religious liberty.” But, a second sense, denoting individual freedom of conscience, belief, practice and so on, also circulates in the discourse of religious liberty. This, I call “religious freedom” (RF). And, in order to avoid confusion with the term, “religious liberty,” I shall reserve that term for general uses bringing both “freedom of religion” with “religious freedom” under the same umbrella. This means that term, “religious liberty,” as commonly used in the literature thus includes both the institutional, “freedom of religion” and individual, “religious freedom.” Why does this distinction matter? Why, in particular, does it matter to “freedom of conscience”? Untangling these two usages, so often smuggled in under the cover of “religious liberty,” can, I urge, make a difference to discussions of freedom of conscience, because freedom of conscience often suffers at the hand of freedom of religion, as does religious freedom itself. In applying this convention, I am also aware that, although conceptually distinct, some FR and RF may have practical, material relations to one another. Thus, it may be the case that, FR, such as freedom of conscience, or freedom to practice one’s religion, are only possible given FR, given some degree of sovereignty of the religious community of which a given individual can form

中文翻译：

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“论宗教自由和良心自由的话语中的对立”

在仔细阅读最近著名的宗教自由选集《宗教自由政治》（Danchin，Hurd，Mahmood和Sullivan，2015年）时，即使发现自己不同意，我也对其中的讨论感到非常兴奋和了解。但是，在本系列中出现的一种令人讨厌的话语逻辑特征一直困扰着我。通常，这只是一个小问题，但我相信，在我所阅读的有关宗教自由的几乎所有内容中，都会出现同样的奇怪之处。这是无法区分“宗教自由”一词的两种含义。第一个含义是制度上的自由或主权。对于第一种“宗教自由”的含义，我将适用“宗教自由”（FR）的约定。但是，第二种意义是指个人的良心，信仰，实践等自由，在宗教自由话语中也有传播。我称之为“宗教自由”（RF）。并且，为了避免与“宗教自由”一词相混淆，我将保留该术语用于一般用途，将“宗教自由”和“宗教自由”归于同一保护伞下。这就是说，文献中常用的“宗教自由”一词既包括制度上的“宗教自由”，又包括个人上的“宗教自由”。为什么这种区别很重要？为什么对“良心自由”特别重要？我敦促弄清经常被“宗教自由”掩盖的这两种用法，可以改变对良心自由的讨论，因为良心自由经常受到宗教自由的影响，就像宗教一样。自由本身。在应用这一约定时，我还知道，尽管从概念上讲是不同的，但某些FR和RF可能在实践上存在实质性的关系。因此，可能的情况是，只有在给定FR的情况下，给定一个人可以形成的宗教团体的某种程度的主权，FR才能实现，例如良心自由或宗教信仰自由