The prohibition on “inhuman treatment” constitutes one of the central tenets of modern international human rights law. However, in the absence of any legislative definition of the term "inhuman", its interpretation becomes challenging. The aim of this article is to critically analyze the interpretation of the term “inhuman” in international human rights law and to suggest a new approach to defining it. The first part of the article highlights the failure of supra-national institutions to provide an independent definition for the term “inhuman”, while mistakenly equating it to other forms of ill-treatment. The second part of the article introduces philosophical concepts necessary for reconstructing the conceptual independence of the term inhuman. It primarily focuses on “the capability approach” and the notion of “human functioning”, as developed by Martha Nussbaum.

中文翻译：

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朝着重建不人道待遇或惩罚的意义：人类能力方法

禁止“不人道待遇”是现代国际人权法的主要宗旨之一。然而，在没有对“非人道”一词的任何立法定义的情况下，其解释变得具有挑战性。本文的目的是对国际人权法中“非人道”一词的解释进行批判性分析，并提出一种新的定义方法。本文的第一部分强调了超国家机构未能为“非人道”一词提供独立的定义，同时错误地将其等同于其他形式的虐待。本文的第二部分介绍了重构非人类一词的概念独立性所必需的哲学概念。它主要关注“能力方法”和“人类功能”的概念，