This paper deals with the theory of needs as a possible justification of human rights. First, it defines the concept of need, which differs from the concept of want. It states that need is, by definition, objective in nature. The paper then analyses some concepts of need (especially those of David Miller and Massimo Renzo) and examines their advantages and disadvantages in relation to justification theories (for example James Griffin's approach which is based on the idea of normative agency). According to the author, these concepts have natural-law foundations and cannot deal, in particular, with the problem of transition from facts to norms. In addition, the requirements that we usually derive from needs retain too much uncertainty. In spite of these shortcomings, using them as arguments in law and even more in politics retains a great convincing power. Its sources are difficult to identify, however, it is an important concept we use in everyday life (though in a shifted meaning). Finally, the author concludes that although needs are not able to establish human rights in a satisfactory way – provided we renounce the universal nature of these rights – they can play a very useful and important role in justifying them in certain local contexts.

中文翻译：

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作为人权辩护的需求理论：不确定性和规范性的现行方法和问题

本文将需求理论作为可能的人权辩护。首先，它定义了需求的概念，与需求的概念不同。它指出，根据定义，需求本质上是客观的。然后，本文分析了需求的某些概念（尤其是戴维·米勒和马西莫·伦佐的需求），并检验了它们在称义理论方面的优缺点（例如，詹姆斯·格里芬的方法基于规范代理的思想）。作者认为，这些概念具有自然法基础，尤其不能处理从事实到规范的过渡问题。此外，我们通常从需求中得出的需求仍然存在太多不确定性。尽管有这些缺点，在法律上甚至在政治上将它们用作论据仍具有巨大的说服力。它的来源很难辨认，但是，它是我们在日常生活中使用的一个重要概念（尽管含义有所变化）。最后，作者得出结论，尽管需求无法以令人满意的方式确立人权（只要我们放弃了这些权利的普遍性），它们就可以在某些当地情况下为它们的合法化发挥非常有用和重要的作用。