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Be Safe or Be Seen? How Russian Activists Negotiate Visibility and Security in Online Resistance Practices
Surveillance & Society ( IF 1.6 ) Pub Date : 2018-10-12 , DOI: 10.24908/ss.v16i3.6967
Tetyana Lokot

This paper examines how Russian opposition activists negotiate online visibility—their own and that of their messages and campaigns—and the security concerns brought on by the pervasive digital surveillance that the state resorts to in order to reinstate its control over the online discursive space. By examining the internet-based presence and activity of the members of Alexey Navalny’s FBK (Anti-Corruption Foundation) and other opposition activists, the paper traces connections between everyday security practices that these activists engage in online and the resistance tactics and repertoires they enact in an environment where the free and open exchange of information on the Russian internet is becoming increasingly difficult. The analysis finds that Russian opposition activists place a high value on digital, media, and security literacy and that navigating the internet using security tools and protocols such as VPN, two-phase authentication, and encrypted messaging is increasingly seen as the default modus operandi for those participating in organised dissent in Russia to mitigate growing state surveillance. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that Russian activists have to balance the need for security with growing visibility—a key factor for entering the mainstream political and social discourse. The tension between being secure and being visible emerges as a key aspect of resistance practices in an environment of near-constant state surveillance, as activists concurrently manage their safety and visibility online to minimise the risks posed by government spying and maximise the effect of their dissent.

中文翻译:

是安全还是被看见?俄罗斯激进主义者如何在在线抵抗实践中就可见性和安全性进行谈判

本文研究了俄罗斯反对派激进分子如何就其自身以及他们的信息和竞选活动的在线可见性进行谈判,以及国家为了恢复对在线话语空间的控制而采取的普遍数字监视所带来的安全隐患。通过检查阿列克谢·纳瓦尼(Alexey Navalny)的FBK(反腐败基金会)和其他反对派激进分子在互联网上的存在和活动,该论文追踪了这些激进分子在网上进行的日常安全实践与他们制定的抵抗策略和手段之间的联系。在俄罗斯互联网上自由开放地交换信息的环境变得越来越困难。分析发现,俄罗斯反对派激进分子对数字,媒体,安全素养以及使用安全工具和协议(例如VPN,两阶段身份验证和加密消息传递)在Internet上浏览,越来越多地被视为参加俄罗斯有组织异议人士的默认方式,以减轻日益增长的国家监视。此外,分析表明,俄罗斯激进主义者必须在对安全的需求与日益增长的知名度之间取得平衡,这是进入主流政治和社会讨论的关键因素。安全性与可见性之间的紧张关系已成为近乎恒定状态监视环境中抵抗行为的一个关键方面,因为激进分子同时在线管理其安全性和可见性,以最大程度地减少政府间谍活动带来的风险并最大程度地提高异议者的影响力。
更新日期:2018-10-12
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