We study earnings per share (EPS) forecast revision and accuracy of banking analysts around operational risk event announcements in U.S. banks. We find that first announcements of operational risk events are more informative than their settlement announcements. Optimistic banking analysts revise their forecasts downward more aggressively around operational risk disclosures, thereby improving forecast accuracy. Career concerns of banking analysts cause an upward bias in forecast revision and deterioration in forecast accuracy only if the potential employer is a systemically important bank (SIB). We find consistent evidence linking competition among banking analysts with optimistic and inaccurate forecasts, which is consistent with analysts seeking to use inflated forecasts to curry favour and attract businesses to their brokerage house around the time of operational risk disclosures. Global settlement has no favourable impact on analyst forecast accuracy around operational risk event announcements. We find evidence supporting a materiality threshold of $10 million for the informativeness of operational risk event announcements in SIBs. Overall, our results shed light on optimism bias in banking analyst behaviour upon the arrival of unanticipated news.

我们围绕美国银行运营风险事件的发布来研究银行分析师的每股收益（EPS）预测修订和准确性。我们发现，操作风险事件的第一个公告比其和解公告更为有用。乐观的银行分析师会围绕操作风险披露更积极地向下修正其预测，从而提高预测准确性。仅当潜在雇主是具有系统重要性的银行（SIB）时，银行分析师的职业问题才会导致预测修订的向上偏差和预测准确性的下降。我们发现一致的证据将银行分析师之间的竞争与乐观和不准确的预测联系起来，这与分析师试图在经营风险披露期间利用夸大的预测来吸引青睐并将其吸引到经纪行中的分析师相一致。全球结算对运营风险事件公告周围的分析师预测准确性没有有利影响。我们发现，支持SIB中操作风险事件公告的信息性的重要性门槛为1000万美元。总体而言，我们的结果揭示了在意外消息到来后，银行分析师的乐观态度。